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Abstract
We examine the construction of electromagnetism in its current form,
and in an alternative form, from a point of view that combines a minimal
realism with strict rational demands. We begin by discussing the requests
of reason when constructing a theory and next, we follow the historical
development as presented in the record of original publications, the under-
lying epistemology (often explained by the authors) and the mathematical
constructions. The historical construction develops along socio-political
disputes (mainly, the reunification of Germany and the second industrial
revolution), epistemic disputes (at least two demarcations of science in
conflict) and several theories of electromagnetism. Such disputes resulted
in the militant adoption of the ether by some, a position that expanded in
parallel with the expansion of Prussia. This way of thinking was facilit-
ated by the earlier adoption of a standpoint that required, as a condition
for understanding, the use of physical hypothesis in the form of analo-
gies; an attitude that is antithetic to Newton’s “hypotheses non fingo”.
While the material ether was finally abandoned, the epistemology sur-
vived in the form of “substantialism” and a metaphysical ether: the space.
The militants of the ether attributed certainties regarding the ether to
Faraday and Maxwell, when they only expressed doubts and curiosity.
Thus, the official story is not the real history. This was achieved by the
operation of detaching Maxwell’s electromagnetism from its construction
and introducing a new game of formulae and interpretations. Large and
important parts of Maxwell work are today not known, as for example,
the rules for the transformation of the electromagnetic potentials between
moving systems. When experiments showed that all the theories based
in the material ether were incorrect, a new interpretation was offered:
Special Relativity (SR). At the end of the transformation period a prag-
matic view of science, well adapted to the industrial society, had emerged,
as well as a new protagonist: the theoretical physicist. The rival theory
of delayed action at distance initiated under the influence of Gauss was
forgotten in the midst of the intellectual warfare. The theory is indis-
tinguishable in formulae from Maxwell’s and its earlier versions are the
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departing point of Maxwell for the construction of his equations. We show
in a mathematical appendix that such (relational) theory can incorpor-
ate Lorentz’ contributions as well as Maxwell’s transformations and C.
Neumann’s action, without resource to the ether. Demarcation criteria
was further changed at the end of the period making room for habits and
intuitions. When these intuited criteria are examined by critical reason
(seeking for the fundaments) they can be sharpened with the use of the
Non Arbitrariness Principle, which throws light over the arbitrariness in
the construction of SR. Under a fully rational view SR is not acceptable, it
requires to adopt a less demanding epistemology that detaches the concept
from the conception, such as Einstein’s own view in this respect, inherited
from Hertz. In conclusion: we have shown in this relevant exercise how
the reality we accept depends on earlier, irrational, decisions that are not
offered for examination but rather are inherited from the culture.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of the XIX century, physics was dominated by ideas that
evolved from Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, and a good number of
distinguished mathematicians such as Laplace, Lagrange, Legendre, Poisson,
Ampère, Gauss and Hamilton that expanded mathematics and physics at the
same time. In continental European physics the space was relational (following
Leibniz) although Descartes’ filled space persisted as a luminiferous ether in the
theory of light and had supporters in electromagnetism (EM) (Caneva, 1980).
In this scheme, the only well known force, gravitational force, was described as
an instantaneous action at distance producing accelerations in the direction of
the line connecting interacting bodies. The tradition in Great Britain (insular
Europe) was of a mixed type. In part, it followed the absolute space tradition
of Newton, in the vulgar form of a frame fixed to the distant stars. At the same
time, in the philosophical side, it followed the empiricist tradition of Hume.
Although Hume speaks about causes and not actions (much less interactions)
it appears to us that in the following paragraph causes can be exchanged by
actions:
The idea, then, of causation must be deriv’d from some relation
among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover.
I find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider’d as causes
or effects, are contiguous; and that nothing can operate in a time
or place, which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence.
[...] We may therefore consider the relation of contiguity as essential
to that of causation; at least may suppose it such, according to the
general opinion, till we can find a more proper occasion to clear up
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this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of
juxtaposition and conjunction.
The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects,
is not so universally acknowledg’d, but is liable to some controversy.
’Tis that of priority of time in the cause before the effect. Some
pretend that ’tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou’d precede
its effect; but that any object or action, in the very first moment
of its existence, may exert its productive quality, and give rise to
another object or action, perfectly co-temporary with itself. [...]
The consequence of this wou’d be no less than the destruction of
that succession of causes, which we observe in the world; and indeed,
the utter annihilation of time. For if one cause were co-temporary
with its effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, ’tis plain
there wou’d be no such thing as succession, and all objects must be
co-existent.(Hume, 1896)
Action at distance and even worse, instantaneous action at distance would have
been felt inappropriate to the empiricist tradition since it would imply a body
causing an effect on another which is non continuous. Lord Kelvin put it in
simple form:
The idea that the Sun pulls Jupiter, and Jupiter pulls back against
the sun with equal force, and that the sun, earth, moon, and planets
all act on one another with mutual attractions seemed to violate the
supposed philosophic principle that matter cannot act where it is
not. (Kelvin’s preface to Hertz, 1893)
It is interesting to observe a sort of pendulum-like movement of ideas between
the continent and Great Britain. Kelvin refers in (Kelvin’s preface to Hertz,
1893) to an observation made by Voltaire in 1727 when he wrote:
A Frenchman who arrives in London finds a great alteration in philo-
sophy, as in other things. He left the world full, he finds it empty. At
Paris you see the Universe composed by vortices of subtile matter;
at London we see nothing of the kind...
However, by the end of the XVIII century action at a distance was the dominant
theory (Kelvin’s preface of Hertz, 1893). The resurgence of ether is credited to
Faraday. Kelvin writes:
...before his death, in 1867, he had succeeded in inspiring the raising
generation of the scientific world with something approaching to
faith that electric force is transmitted by a medium called ether, of
which, as it had been believed by the whole scientific world for forty
years, light and radiant heat are transversal vibrations.
And he continues:
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...for electricity and magnetism Faraday’s anticipations and Clerk-
Maxwell’s splendidly developed theory has been established on the
sure basis of experiments by Hertz’ work...
In this form goes the standard story, but, is it correct? Is it faithful to history?
We will show that there are missing parts in this story probably because Hertz
gave the name Maxwell’s theory to all theories that agreed with Maxwell’s in the
final equations to be tested (Hertz, 1893). Hertz mentions Helmholtz theory as
well and he indicates the existence of others. The omitted theories were those
of the Göttingen group that gathered around the figure of Gauss and included
rivals of Maxwell as Lorenz, Riemann, Newmann and especially Weber whose
differences with Hertz’ mentor, Helmholtz, are well known (Assis, 1994). Thus,
personal rivalries and other social phenomena, as we will later see, might have
played a role in the final (social) outcome.1
Towards the mid of the XIX century, the force of the Enlightenment was
declining in Europe while the force of the British Empire and the second in-
dustrial revolution was emerging along with the struggle for the unification of
Germany. Political events seldom have an influence on the development of sci-
ence; rather, they influence indirectly through the “ethos of the times“. However,
in the construction of Electromagnetism they influenced in both forms as we will
see.
Let us turn back to philosophical issues. The construction of EM must con-
front difficulties not present in the construction of mechanics. In particular,
most EM phenomena do not appear as such, i.e., as an occurrence, percept-
ible to the senses, since we have constructed two covering concepts, matter and
light, that naturalise most of our experience with electricity. In that time, mat-
ter and light were conceived as “external“ entities on which EM phenomena
occur, rather than entities whose properties are almost entirely of electromag-
netic nature. Thus, the study of EM proceeds with little sensorial input in
the form of experimental outcomes. Our possibilities of using our intuition and
direct experience is then scarce and we must rely on reason and the process of
abduction (Peirce, 1955). In turn, abduction –the process of adopting (testable)
explanatory hypotheses– is often aided by analogies and habits as a form of
producing the hypothesis for consideration. However, the value of the abduced
hypothesis is not to be judged by such auxiliary methods but rather for its ex-
planatory power over the facts, that must necessarily be a larger set than those
that motivated the hypothesis. Peirce prevents us:
observed facts relate exclusively to the particular circumstances that
happened to exist when they were observed. They do not relate
to any future occasions upon which we may be in doubt how we
ought to act. They, therefore, do not, in themselves, contain any
1Helmholtz and Hertz developments occur at a particular time of German history. Helm-
holtz becomes head of the Berlin school of physics soon after the beginning of the first
Reich (the Kaiserreich) (Hoffmann, 1998). In that period there was a battle against Hegel’s
philosophy. Helmholtz is among those struggling to abandon Hegel’s idealism and methods
(D’Agostino, 2004).
4
practical knowledge. Such knowledge must involve additions to the
facts observed. The making of those additions is an operation which
we can control; and it is evidently a process during which error is
liable to creep in.(Peirce, 1955, p. 150)
Did these recommendations guided the construction of EM? We anticipate that
the answer is no. On the contrary, we will show that analogical thinking operates
as a restriction upon what can be constructed.
By the beginning of the XX century, a complete turn around of ideas in phys-
ics had been achieved. Those ideas became the consensus form of physics some
years later. The changes that were operated far exceeded a scientific revolution.
We intend to show in this work the epistemic transformation of physics produced
by the lectors of Maxwell (rather than by Maxwell himself). The transformation
of physics was not limited to the incorporation of a new domain of understand-
ing. Rather, it was a complex development producing a new type of scientist, the
theoretical physicist, that took the duties of constructing the theories, which was
previously performed by mathematicians (Jungnickel and McCormmach, 2017,
p. 6). The new field of studies, the new social subject, came equipped with its
own epistemology, a radical change of which the practitioners were probably not
aware, except perhaps (and partially) two of the main protagonists: Poincaré
(Poincaré, 1913a) and Einstein (Einstein, 1936, 1940).
The plan for this work is to critically follow the transformation of the
ideas in Electromagnetism in the period going from Ampère (Ampère, 1825;
Assis and Chaib, 2015) to the emergence of special relativity (SR) (Einstein,
1905; Schwartz, 1977a,b,c) focusing in the epistemic changes produced. We will
begin by focusing in Ampère-Weber’s relational approach and its social decline
(a decline without refutation). Next, we move to the epistemological contribu-
tions of Maxwell that anticipate key elements in Husserl’s phenomenology and
the controversy regarding physical hypotheses (such as the electric fluid and the
ether). The next stage consists in the abandonment of Maxwell philosophical at-
titude by his followers: the beginning of the new era. This crucial step explains
(or perhaps just describes) how philosophy was left behind and how a new form
of construction of science was born, with new elements such as interpretations
and analogies being central to it. It is the epistemological change what converts
a phenomenological theory as Maxwell’s (in his own words) into a fundamental
theory, first of the material ether and later of the philosophical ether: the space.
The lax rules of the new epistemology allowed the new scientists to patch their
theories, producing an era of “continuous progress“, greatly facilitated by the
abandonment of the idea of refutation, of the search for the fundamentals (i.e.,
critical thought, philosophically understood) and of the unity of reason of Kan-
tian idealism. This is, the Gordian-knot was repeatedly cut rather than untied,
thus resulting in a conceptual change of what it is meant by science: the adop-
tion of pragmatic-realism as already described by other authors (Torretti, 2000)
and substantially in agreement with the ethos of the time.
While the new scientist developed and occupied the social niche of producer
of theory, the old epistemological approach did not get extinct. From time to
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time, challenges to themain stream have been raised by, or re-emerged in, various
scientific groups having a closer affinity with the Galilean-Newtonian heritage.
Among the challenges, those emerged in the electrical engineering domain are
the most interesting since this scientific community has considered discrimin-
ating experiments between a relational electromagnetism and the relativistic
version of electromagnetism. Curiously enough, the situations they considered
by 1956, motivated by the initial explorations of outer space have emerged in
later years as an “anomaly” of the main stream electromagnetism. But what
would have been trumpeted as an extraordinary predictive success of science
if achieved by the dominant conceptions has gained little or no transcendence:
social forces guard us from heretic knowledge as Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1999) has
taught us.
It is important to notice that reviewing the emergence of a new field of study
can be done from two (extreme) sides; one side being the praiseful form and the
other its opposite, the derogatory form. We began our search trying to find
what at that moment we thought was a small missing link between a relativistic
and a relational theory of EM. Along the way we realised that the differences
cannot be bridged since there is no common epistemological ground to both
approaches. A similar transition can be found in Dingle (Dingle, 1960b).
Using a constructivist approach we have sought to transcend the foundations
of mechanics (Solari and Natiello, 2018) unearthing and giving a mathematical
form to a principle of reason: the no-arbitrariness principle (NAP). It has been
the philosophical guidance provided by NAP what made us to regress in time
until an epoch where physics was compatible with it. We were not able to locate
a period in time which was free from arbitrariness. There is e.g., arbitrariness
in the Ampère-Weber theory, although it can easily be removed. In so do-
ing, it becomes even closer to Maxwell’s theory. Maxwell himself practices the
epojé 2 hence arbitrariness is put in parenthesis/suspended. This attitude differs
drastically with the attitude of his followers which is the entry-point through
which a full flared arbitrariness is introduced. Thus, as we adopted as starting
point a commitment to reason, and a method for preserving reason, departures
from the rational ideal will be highlighted. We begin by presenting requisites of
reason that must be satisfied in the construction of a mathematical theory (Sec-
tion 2), this is, we introduce “rational realism”. Next we review the main line
of development of Electromagnetism up to and including Maxwell (Section 3).
Among other historical information we identify in Maxwell’s writings the trans-
formations undergone by the potentials upon a Galilean change of coordinates.
The ether era is discussed in Section 4. We analyse the epistemological changes
that made it possible (actually, almost mandatory) to believe in the ether. The
two epistemological venues are then contrasted. Subsection 4.3 and Appendices
A and B explore the electromagnetism that results from applying the construct-
ive rational rules of Section 2. Subsection 4.4 is dedicated to the contribution by
Einstein, the final point of the evolution of current electromagnetism. We show
2Scepticism. The act of refraining from any conclusion for or against anything as the
decisive step for the attainment of truth.
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that this view is not possible under the “rational realism”, complementary, in
Appendix B.2 we offer a relevant and example on how epistemological blindness
operates. The final sections correspond to discussions and conclusions.
2 The scientific attitude and the inference of a
theory
Scientists conceive the world as a cosmos, a harmonious totality. For them,
there is nothing as fascinating as discovering this harmony. For this task they
are equipped basically with two tools: reason and experience. What they call
understanding is the result of the interplay of the two, for experience does not
constitute knowledge if not for the intervention of reason. These ideas (and
some words) are taken from Kant (Kant, 1787) and Peirce (Peirce, 1955) and
do not change in their strength if, rather than considering the world as a cosmos,
we change the proposition to: the goal of the scientist is to articulate a harmonic
vision of the world, to make a cosmos out of the sensorial input she/he receives.
2.1 Some rules for the construction of a cosmos
The task of understanding the construction of EM requires some precision on
what we mean by reason and the requisites for inference.
The principle of reality In the first place, we must indicate that the attempt
of constructing a cosmos out of sensorial input implies the assumption that there
is something real that reaches us through the senses, this is to say, that there
is subject and object. While the truth of this statement is debatable, we can
consider the dangers involved in accepting or rejecting it. Little damage is done
if accepting reality were an error and it turns to be that everything is part of
a unique encompassing (solipsistic) being. On the contrary, if we were in error
when rejecting reality, we would become completely dysfunctional and miss one
of the greatest opportunities in life. The principle is summarised in:
“Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated
in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose char-
acters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those
Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our
sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet,
by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by
reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have
sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to
the one True conclusion. The new conception here involved is that
of Reality.”(Peirce, 1955, p. 18)
Hence, we adopt realism as a starting point and reject conspiratorial theories,
this is, we reject hypotheses which cannot be put to experimental test. We state
this starting point in the form of a principle (Solari and Natiello, 2018):
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Principle 1 There is a material world that we perceive with our senses (in-
cluding experiments).
The no arbitrariness principle In a recent work, we have shown that if we
introduce some arbitrary decisions in the scientific discourse (be it for the sake of
the argument or with the aim of facilitating an explanation), the set of possible
arbitrary elements must have the internal structure of a group3, being then the
set of all possible presentations of the argument a representation of the group
and as such equivalents (Solari and Natiello, 2018). Further, we have shown
that the facilitation of the relational concept of space due to Leibniz produced
by the introduction of a privileged observer introduces a (useful) subjective
element, the subjective space (the space of all elementary physics texts) along
with a series of properties of this space as well as conditions that the statements
regarding physical laws must satisfy if they are going to remain rational.
The set of arbitrary decisions deserves some further consideration. It has
been indicated (Margenau and Mould, 1957), in consideration of their own ver-
sions of NAP, that choosing different arbitrary sets where the statement (ob-
servation) should identically hold might lead to different theories. Therefore,
a clarification of the concept of arbitrariness in this context is needed. It is
important to indicate that any difference that is dictated by experimental and
observational methods should be considered not to be arbitrary, but there is
more to it. For example, the class of (idealised) isolated systems, when we
disregard their internal structure, admits a group of arbitrariness. We call
this class of systems inertial (Solari and Natiello, 2018). They are to be dis-
tinguished from those systems that indicate as a necessity the presence of a
companion one. But since isolated systems are an idealisation, the same can
be said for inertial systems, thus, approximately-inertial systems must exist. In
practice, then, if a system can be considered inertial or not, depends on the
extent that the presence of other matter not being accounted for can sensibly
modify the experimental outcome. This view has been held by experimentalists
such as Michelson (Michelson, 1904).
This view of inertia must be contrasted with the subjective view. In the sub-
jective view the subject tries to draw a definition from her/his own experience.
She/he imagines being in a cage from which all input from the exterior has been
cut, and extrapolates experiences within the cage to: “If the cage moves with
constant velocity (in some subjective space she/he does not dare to mention)
I won’t be able to grasp the velocity with which I am moving. On the other
hand, if the cage changes direction, it comes to a stop or sets to move faster, I
3For example: We can say that the relations in the invariant relational space are lifted into
relations in the subjective spaces by arbitrary decisions, but since the subjective statements
must remain equivalent, there must be a group of transformations, G, that allows us to move
from one presentation to the other. If we conceive now a theory as a space of statements, E,
relating different concepts belonging to our subjective presentation, what is real in them is
only the core that remains when we remove (mod out) the arbitrariness, T = E/G, which is
the result of identifying statements that only differ by the introduced arbitrariness. Thus, T
is invariant while E is equivariant with respect to G.
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will know the cage is accelerated and then non-inertial, for I am likely to bump
on the cage borders”. Thus, the non-inertial system is revealed as not being
isotropic nor homogeneous, which are precisely the symmetries required to sup-
press the arbitrariness of the subject. In case our subject finds her/himself in a
non-inertial system, she/he will try to find out which are the particular proper-
ties of this space, something that has to be constructed by comparison with the
expectations with respect to inertial space. Such space will now be loaded with
characteristics potentially varying from point to point, this is, described by a
mathematical field. This is about how far the construction of reality initiated
by the self-centered-child can be taken, for any step further would lead to the
recognition of the observer as arbitrary (one out of many possible observers),
rather than observing through the eyes of God, that sees reality the way reality
is. Such a surpassing step would force our observer to leave behind some of
her/his most cherished toys, such as space, or kinetic energy (in as much as it
is not relational).
When constructing a theory we have to make an early decision: are we going
to introduce arbitrariness or not? The decision has not much relevance if we keep
track of the introduced arbitrariness, and acknowledge the necessity of (and the
methods for) removing it. However, if we lose consciousness of our constructive
effort, we might inadvertently enter into the realm of arbitrariness. No amount
of mathematics will take us ever out of the subjetivist cage, since the necessary
step is not an analytic/deductive judgement but rather a synthetic/critical one.
This is, we need to understand not what the consequences of our beliefs are,
but rather which is the foundation of our beliefs.
If arbitrariness is the absence of reason, the double negation in no-arbitrariness
is equivalent to reason. This is, the rejection of arbitrariness is a condition put
on every rational construction (Solari and Natiello, 2018).
Principle 2 [ No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP)] No knowledge of Nature
depends on arbitrary decisions.
The imagination as limit The introduction of explanatory hypothesis, the
process of abduction, is subject to the control of rationality and to the condition
that the newly introduced hypothesis explains a class of problems larger that
the one that motivated it, this is, that the hypothesis bears some of the main
ingredients of cognitive surpass (Piaget and García, 1989) and offers itself more
openly to refutation. However, the requisites for the acceptance of explanat-
ory hypotheses (i.e., to be able to stand in front of refutation attempts) says
nothing about the method of production. There are no conditions for the pro-
cess of creation of hypotheses to be tested. The most natural source would be
the intuition of the sensible, empiria, but in the case of EM data is scarce and
manifests itself as e.g., the deviation of a needle or a change in the equilibrium
point of a scale, that only indirectly represent the phenomena. Hypotheses are
then constructed supplementing data with imagination. Since entertaining and
testing hypotheses requires considerable effort, there is a preselection of prom-
ising hypotheses. In most (all?) cases the chosen hypotheses are those produced
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by analogy and/or habit. Thus, physical hypothesis in the form of mechanical
systems (particles, fluids, springs, ...) enter the electromagnetic scene and are
erroneously placed as empirical input. Under the name of “physical reasoning”,
physics instructors will train their students4 to seek answers in these terms. In
so doing, they advance irrational constructions in substitution of the far more
difficult rational ones. The increment in the use of analogies during the second
part of the XIX century is well documented in (Jungnickel and McCormmach,
2017). But these irrational constructs play a fundamental role when an ob-
servational problem has to be cast into formulae and vice versa. The physical
hypothesis and analogies (a constitutive part of theories seldom recognised as
such since only formulae appear to have the attributes necessary for recognition)
are the main nexus with the observable reality.
What we can construct as images and memories comes from what is perceived
by our senses and since human beings are largely visual animals, the root “image”
in “imagination” must be taken almost at a literal value. However, if we limit
our explanatory hypotheses to those that can be produced by these methods,
we will soon produce a sensible analogy among matters that, precisely, are of
a different (immaterial) kind. For example interactions are inferred elements
and do not have a material form, but our method of generating hypotheses will
assign to them the characteristics of bodies, thus, they will be placed in space
by analogy with waves in a material media or particles travelling from here to
there. Even Lorenz, that strongly objected the ether (Lorenz, 1867) found it
necessary to have a material medium (Lorenz, 1863). The following text of Lord
Kelvin illustrates analogy and imagination as a limit:
I never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a
thing. If I can make a mechanical model I can understand it. As
long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I
cannot understand; and that is why I cannot get [this is probably the
reporter’s Americanism for the word “accept”] the electromagnetic
theory.(Thompson, 2011, p.235)
The continuity principle (reduction to the obvious/evident) Argu-
mentations are constructed in such a way that they rest upon small units we
consider evident or obvious. Yet, what is obvious or evident for some, may
not be so for others. One of the forms in which we usually identify potentially
irrational arguments is by detecting hiatus or lacunæ in the argumentation.
The request “please, fill in the gap“ quite often reveals a belief that cannot be
supported while being essential to the argument. On the contrary, the rational
argumentation proceeds to fill the gaps by explaining how they consist of the
4Anthropologist Sharon Traweek observes about high-energy physicists that “Undergradu-
ate physics students, to be successful, must display a high degree of intellectual skill, par-
ticularly in analogical thinking. The students learn from textbooks whose interpretation of
physics is not to be challenged; in fact, it is not to be seen as interpretation.“ (p. 74, Traweek,
1992). Also (p. 77): “Teachers show students how to recognize that a new problem is like
this or that familiar problem; in this introduction to the repertoire of soluble problems to be
memorized, the student is taught not induction or deduction but analogic thinking.”
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concatenation of smaller pieces, iterating the process until the pieces are ac-
cepted as evident or obvious. This self-similar form corresponds to what in
mathematics is called continuity.
The mediation principle and the dialectical openings We do not usu-
ally accept as reasonable that which appears out of nothingness as self-evident
assertions. We normally request a new rational-belief to be derived (mediated)
by acceptable argumentation from accepted beliefs. This recurrent form of reas-
oning cannot be pursued indefinitely. It comes to an end when we reach a point
in which beliefs can no longer be derived from other accepted beliefs. At this
point there seems to be only one option: Either we make explicit a layer of
arbitrary assumptions (axioms) which is the opaque end that reason lets us see,
or we find a set of opposing concepts and ideas that in their interplay constitute
the foundation of our discussion; the dialectical openings(Solari and Natiello,
2018). The participating concepts or ideas support each other by oppositions
and they exist only as dialectically opposing elements, while it is this opposi-
tion what we consider as perceived, as real. In case that we decide to introduce
arbitrary hypothesis and yet remain rational, we would be forced to mod them
out as explained in NAP, thus something not arbitrary would have to survive.
Hence, the alternative is: irrational or dialectic.
Logical action in front of contradictions Whenever a chain of reasoning
arrives to a contradiction, the whole chain is rejected. When the contradiction
results from comparing theoretical prediction and experimental reality we speak
of an experimental refutation. The logical scheme can be depicted as A ⇒
B ⇒ [further consequences] ⇒ False. No matter how pleasant B and other
intermediate consequences are, there is no support for them. The most evident
example is the hypothesis of the ether which is fundamental for the proposition
of Maxwell’s displacement field. Discarding the existence of the ether (following
empirical evidence) under the present principle would mean the refutation of the
hypothesis as well as all of its consequences. The theory of EM would have to
be retracted to the point at which it incorporated light and then reconstructed
again under new hypotheses. Sustaining a thesis despite that its argumentation
has been shown to be false is the case of persistence in Peirce’s classification of
the methods of fixating beliefs (Peirce, 1955, ch. 2). It is, as such, irrational.
There is another instance of the same logical scheme which is not usually
considered, namely when the contradiction stems from the logical structure
of the theory (e.g., inconsistent postulates). Assume A is True, then −A is
False. The construction A ⇒ B ⇒ [further consequences] ⇒ (−A) discloses an
internal contradiction of the theory and, as above, it forces us to reject the full
chain. It is observed that some authors are tempted to change the sequence into:
Axiom B is true, B ⇒ [further consequences]⇒ (−A) detaching the statements
from its production process keeping (without an alternative argumentation) the
desired result. Informally, we call the process “cutting the branch we are sitting
on“, we fall in this case into a violation of the continuity principle and the
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mediation principle. This situation relates directly to observations made by
Dingle (1960b) in which the author finds that in the construction of Special
Relativity the formulae are detached of their physical meaning.
On reason What is reason then? How can we reason about what reason is?
Reason can only be conceived in front of no-reason, of arbitrariness. But arbit-
rary is the statement that introduces a belief without admitting doubt about it
(perhaps by conviction/persistence, or authority). Hence, to discuss reason and
arbitrariness we need to discuss belief and doubt, the forms of fixation of beliefs,
and the relations between these elements. Further, since what is imposed one
way or another (as in arbitrariness) cannot be said to be harmonious, we find
that reason is directly related to harmony. Perhaps at this point it is better to
consider our fundamental insight: we feel in peace only with a rational world,
a world with harmony, a cosmos, and not a world that is the result of power
and arbitrariness. Hence, our choice of reason for the organisation of the world
emerges directly from our feelings. These feelings can be made universal, for
it is possible to conceive a humanity of free persons that consistently entertain
doubts and peacefully cooperate to progress in their common beliefs, while it is
not possible to conceive a peaceful coexistence of arbitrary beliefs, except in the
final state of uniformity (death). Rather than coexisting peacefully, arbitrary
beliefs tend to replace each other by forceful imposition. Thus, our choice for
rationality is not rational, it emerges from our feelings, and it is perhaps because
of them that reason will ever re-emerge.
2.2 Vulgar pragmatism
Would a scientist agree on the need of being reasonable and on the meaning of
reason? We expect not to find a scientist rejecting the idea of being reasonable.
Furthermore, we cannot conceive a scientist admitting not being reasonable
without at the same time withdrawing her/his argument. But self-evaluation of
our own reasonability is usually poor in self-criticism, for reasoning is often this
thing that I am doing, while I have no access to the totality of the processes of
reasoning in others. Some schools of thought (we will call them sophists) regard
reasoning as just one form (among several others) of disputing and convincing.
Philosophers have in turn indicated that reasoning is not always at the core
of scientific research (Feyerabend, 1987) and that only instrumental reason is
actually being used (Horkheimer, 1947).
One of the cornerstones of reasonability is to reject logical inconsistency.
The attitude we take in front of error is decisive: the scientific person yields
to reason and to empirical evidence. If a theory is found to be inconsistent,
and also if it produces predictions against empirical evidence, its reasonability
collapses, we are no longer satisfied by its explanatory power and it is therefore
rejected, as Peirce explicitly requested5 and later Popper will make central to
his philosophy of science (Popper, 1959).
5See e.g., “It is a great mistake to suppose that the mind of the active scientist is filled
with propositions which, if not proved beyond all reasonable cavil, are at least extremely
12
At first sight, this vision is probably shared by most scientists. On the
contrary, the attitude of persistence in beliefs (tenacity (ch. 2, Peirce, 1955), in
Peirce’s denomination) despite empirical evidence against them or despite logical
inconsistencies, is one form of being non-scientific. Note that our objection is
not to the results or predictions that a non-scientific theory could produce,
but rather to its construction. Considering success in prediction ability as the
only measure of scientific correctness amounts to replacing the attitude of the
scientist with some form of vulgar pragmatism. Peirce (Fixation of belief, Peirce,
1955) regards human actions as the outcome of the struggle between doubt and
belief. The former provokes tension and the urge for resolution, the latter is a
state of peace of mind towards which we strive. He further identifies reason as
the only way of fixating beliefs that is free of arbitrariness, quite in line with
the concept of critical pragmatism (Pennycook, 1997) or –as we prefer to call it–
scientific pragmatism. Any method of fixating beliefs other than reason, e.g., the
argument by confirmation or verification that a belief is useful for any purpose
other than reasonability (personal benefit, success, the imposition of an idea,
etc.) will be called vulgar pragmatism, in line with (Pennycook, 1997).
The problems presented by the incorporation of light into EM had become
so frustrating by the beginning of the XX century that Poincaré was willing
to accept a radical change in the scientific attitude, this is, the acceptance of
“persistence in beliefs“, the unwillingness of dropping our theories when they
are contradicted by experiments (a form of vulgar pragmatism already identi-
fied by Peirce (Peirce, 1955, ch. 2) by 1887). But perhaps most remarkable, is
the degree of collective blindness that developed, since shortly after Maxwell’s
landmark paper, read in December 1864 (Maxwell, 1865), Lorenz presented his
extension of Weber’s theory incorporating light without ether (Lorenz, 1867),
a relational theory that as such predicted way in advance the outcome of the
famous Michelson-Morley experiment and that was found to be identical to Max-
well’s theory when later applied to Hertz’ experiments. We look to this situation
with perplexity. By 1881 there were two theories (Lorenz’ and Maxwell’s) and
one discriminant experiment (Michelson’s). Despite the correspondence of the
experimental results with only one of the theories, we persist in patching the
failed theory using conspiratorial thoughts?
This was not an isolated fact. By the turn of the century the change in
epistemological attitude away from the scientific approach and towards verific-
ationism became increasingly evident. Let us consider the proposition:
Supposons que, dans une nuit, toutes les dimensions de l’univers
deviennent mille fois plus grandes: le monde sera resté semblable
à lui-même, en donnant au mot de similitude le même sens qu’au
3° livre de géométrie. Seulement, ce qui avait un mètre de long
mesurera désormais un kilomètre, ce qui était long d’un millimètre
probable. On the contrary, he entertains hypotheses which are almost wildly incredible, and
treats them with respect for the time being. Why does he do this? Simply because any
scientific proposition whatever is always liable to be refuted and dropped at short notice.“
(p.36) “But the scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole
cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them.“ (p.46) (Peirce, 1955)
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deviendra long d’un mètre. Le lit où je suis couché et mon corps
lui-même se seront agrandis dans la même proportion. Quand je
me réveillerai le lendemain matin, quel sentiment éprouverai-je en
présence d’une aussi étonnante transformation? Eh bien, je ne m’aper-
cevrai de rien du tout. Les mesures le plus précises seront incapables
de me rien révéler de cet immense bouleversement puisque les mètres
dont je me ser virai auront varié précisément dans les mêmes propor-
tions que les objets que je chercherai à mesurer... D’après Lorentz
et Fitzgerald tous les corps entraînés dans le mouvement de la Terre
subis sent une déformation. Cette déformation est à la vérité très
faible, puisque toutes les dimensions parallèles au mouvement de la
Terre diminueraient d’un cent millionième, tandis que les dimensions
perpendiculaires à ce mouvement ne seraient pas altérées. (Poincaré,
1906)
This argumentation has several problems. The proposed contraction is imper-
ceptible, nothing changes in our relation to the world if we accept it or reject
it except probably the issue that it intends to explain. As an explanatory hy-
pothesis it does not meet the requisite of explaining more than the observation
that suggested it. The explanation proceeds through something otherwise un-
verifiable and of no practical consequences whatsoever (as the excerpt claims).
There are no grounds to prefer this explanation to other alternatives. It only
serves the purpose of fixating our belief that there is no mistake in the con-
siderations that led us to the conclusion that the speed of light should depend
on the velocity of Earth relative to the ether. The idea of having to accept
such a conspiratorial hypothesis to save a theory of its wreckage is indignant.
With higher dignity, Kelvin rejects the vibrations of the ether as an explanation
of light since: “I firmly believe in an electromagnetic theory of light, and that
when we understand electricity and magnetism and light we shall see them all
together as parts of a whole. But I want to understand light as well as I can,
without introducing things that we understand even less of.“ (Thompson, 2011,
pp. 835–836)
It should be noticed on passing that Poincaré’s attitudes towards Lorentz’
theories had been fluctuating. In a homage to Lorentz, Poincaré writes:
It would no doubt seem strange that in a monument raised to the
glory of Lorentz I would review the considerations which I presented
previously as an objection to his theory. I could say that the pages
which follow are rather in the nature of an attenuation rather than a
magnification of that objection. But I disdain that excuse, because
I have one which is 100 times better: Good theories are flexible.
Those which have a rigid form and which can not change that form
without collapsing really have too little vitality. But if a theory is
solid, then it can be cast in diverse forms, it resists all attacks, and
its essential meaning remains unaffected. (Poincaré, 1900)
It appears from this text that a theory is not “vital“ enough if it “collapses“ in
front of contradictory empirical evidence.
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What is, then, the goal of an explanatory hypothesis? In the views of sci-
entific pragmatism it is “to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the
establishment of an habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappoin-
ted“ (p. 267, Peirce, 1955), through subjection to the test of experiment. In
the absence of any special reasons for the contrary, any hypothesis, therefore,
may be admissible provided it being capable of experimental verification, and
only in so far as it is capable of such verification. Peirce again: “An explanatory
hypothesis, that is to say, a conception which does not limit its purpose to en-
abling the mind to grasp into one a variety of facts, but which seeks to connect
those facts with our general conceptions of the universe, ought, in one sense, to be
verifiable; that is to say, it ought to be little more than a ligament of numberless
possible predictions concerning future experience, so that if they fail, it fails“
(p. 267, Peirce, 1955, (our emphasis)).
Other indications of the advance of different forms of vulgar pragmatism
arose along the XX century:
Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense
experience a logically uniform system of thought.(Einstein, 1940)
The word “uniform“ has taken the place of “harmony“. But harmony is the
quality of producing a single and pleasant totality, while uniformity implies the
suppression of differences, something that many of us find utterly unpleasant
since we regard life as a harmonious diversity and death as uniformity (remain-
ing the same in all cases and at all times). The search for the unity of reason
is then replaced by the search of a uniform symbolic manipulation of all forces,
see for example (Smolin and Harnad, 2008), being the later a goal akin to in-
dustrialisation rather than to Enlightenment. The unity of reason requires to
transcend the oppositions/differences (at the same time preserving them) or uni-
fying them in their differences by surpassing them (Piaget and García, 1989),
achieving a more abstract and encompassing vision.
According to Einstein:
“Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of
evolution, and whose basis cannot be obtained through distillation
by any inductive method from the experiences lived through, but
which can only be attained by free invention. The justification (truth
content) of the system rests in the proof of usefulness of the resulting
theorems on the basis of sense experiences, where the relations of the
latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively. Evolution
is going on in the direction of increasing simplicity of the logical
basis“. (Einstein, 1940)
It appears from this statement that physics has no roots, it floats in the air
as a free invention without ties. Since the ties that enter the construction of
a theory rule the use of the theory, the reverse link between theoretical results
and sensorial experiences rests upon some sort of “intuition“. It is not intuition
with its usual philosophical meaning (a central idea in (Husserl, 1983) where
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intuition mediates in the process of ideation, the construction of the empirical
input into ideas and later theories). The word “intuition“ in the above quota-
tion must be understood as involving elements removed from rational control.
The “physics“ is thus bracketed between nothingness and irrationality since the
ties of philosophical intuition as well as the rational ties of the continuity and
mediation principles have been removed, constructing then a new epistemology
that resembles vulgar pragmatism: it is true because it is useful.
2.3 Maxwell’s epistemic position
James Clerk Maxwell’s contributions to electromagnetism culminated in his
Treatise (Maxwell, 1873) where he extends his foundational paper (Maxwell,
1865) into a comprehensive work encompassing old and new mathematics and
physics developed along several decades. In both works, Maxwell introduces
considerations that correspond better to epistemology than to mathematics or
physics.
From the beginning, his goal is to describe electromagnetic phenomena by
means of local interactions with the surrounding medium (the ether), as opposed
to the action at a distance theories, more developed outside England. Maxwell
begins by celebrating the continental tradition of electromagnetism (Maxwell,
1865):
The most obvious mechanical phenomenon in electrical and mag-
netical experiments is the mutual action by which bodies in certain
states set each other in motion while still at a sensible distance from
each other. The first step, therefore, in reducing this phenomena
into scientific form is to ascertain the magnitude and direction of
the force acting between the bodies [...]
In this way, mathematical theories of statical electricity, of magnet-
ism, of the mechanical action between conductors carrying currents
and of the induction of currents have been formed [...]
These theories assume, more or less explicitly, the existence of sub-
stances the particles of which have the property of acting on one
another at a distance by attraction or repulsion. The most complete
development of a theory of this kind is that of M. W. (Weber, 1846)
who made the same theory include both electrostatic and electro-
magnetic phenomena.
In doing so, however, he has found it necessary to assume that the
force between two electric particles depend on their relative velocity,
as well as on their distance.
This theory, as developed by M. W. Weber and C. Neumann, is ex-
ceedingly ingenious, and wonderfully comprehensive in its applica-
tion to phenomena of statical electricity, electromagnetic attractions,
induction of currents and diamagnetic phenomena; and it comes to
us with the more authority as it has served to guide the speculations
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of one who has made so great an advance in the practical part of
electric science, both by introducing a consistent systems of units
in electrical measurement, and by actually determining electrical
quantities with an accuracy hitherto unknown6.
In other parts of the Treatise, Maxwell points out that his theory and Weber’s
arrive to the same descriptions of different electromagnetic phenomena. See e.g.,
([644], [855] Maxwell, 1873) among similar comments scattered along the work.
However, he finds Weber’s approach too difficult (Maxwell, 1865), arguing as
follows for his point of view:
(2) The mechanical difficulties, however, which are involved in the
assumption of particles acting at distance with forces that depend
on their velocities are much as to prevent me from considering this
theory as an ultimate one, thought it might have been and may yet
be useful in leading to the coordination of phenomena.
I have therefore preferred to seek an explanation of the fact in an-
other direction by supposing them to be produced by actions which
go on the surrounding medium as well as in the excited bodies, and
endeavouring to explain the action between distant bodies without
assuming the existence of forces capable of acting directly at sensible
distances.
(3) The theory I propose may be therefore be called a theory of
the Electromagnetic Field, because it has to do with the space in
the neighbourhood of the electric or magnetic bodies, and may be
called a Dynamical Theory, because it assumes that in that space
there is matter in motion, by which the observed electromagnetic
phenomena are produced.
In his Treatise, Maxwell explains further ([529] Maxwell, 1873):
We are accustomed to consider the universe as made up of parts,
and mathematicians usually begin by considering a single particle,
and then conceiving its relation to another particle and so on. This
has generally been supposed the most natural method. To conceive
of a particle, however, requires a process of abstraction, since all
our perceptions are related to extended bodies, so that the idea of
the all that is in our consciousness at a given instant is perhaps as
primitive an idea as that of any individual thing. Hence there may be
a mathematical method in which we proceed from the whole to the
parts instead of from the parts to the whole. For example, Euclid,
in his first book conceives a line as traced out by a point, a surface
as swept out by a line and a solid as generated by a surface. But he
also defines a surface as the boundary of a solid, a line as the edge
of a surface and a point as the extremity of a line.
6Maxwell tries to confine Weber within the status of somebody concerned with the “prac-
tical part“, since the great advance indicated is precisely Weber’s work.
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Both in the main text of these works and also in the Preface of the Treatise,
Maxwell claims that his views are based on the approach of Faraday to elec-
tromagnetic phenomena. However, while Faraday entertained doubts about the
necessity of the ether and indeed advanced an alternative explanation, Maxwell
misinterprets Faraday writings (in text and spirit) as already pointed out clearly
in Dingle (1960b, p. 250-52). In the work cited by Maxwell, Faraday writes, in
the manuscript entitled “Thoughts on ray vibrations“ (Faraday, 1855, p. 447),
The point intended to be set forth for consideration of the hearers
was, whether it was not possible that the vibrations that in certain
theory are assumed to account for radiation and radiant phænom-
ena cannot occur in the lines of force which connect particles, and
consequently masses of matter together; a motion that, as far as it
is admitted, will dispense with the æther, which in another view is
supposed to be the medium in which this vibrations take place.
You are aware of the speculation which I some times since uttered
respecting that view of the nature of matter that considers its ul-
timate atoms as centres of force, and not as so many little bodies
surrounded by forces, the bodies being considered in the abstract as
independent of the forces and capable of existing without them. In
the later view, this little atoms have a definite form and a certain
limited size; in the former view such is not the case, for that which
represents size may be considered as extending to any distance to
which the lines of force of the particle extends: the particle indeed
is supposed to exist only by this forces, and were they are it is.
Faraday’s speculation about matter is “A speculation touching Electric Conduc-
tion and the Nature of Matter“ (Faraday, 1844, p. 284) and rests upon ideas of
Boscovich. The speculation is not an opinion, Faraday philosophically proceeds
to show that current ideas on matter (of that time, 1844) were incompatible
with electricity before adopting Boscovich’s view. The view basically consists
in a duality7. We only know about matter because of its actions (forces) and we
locate matter where the centre of this action lies. If the action extends through
the universe, the atoms are “where they act“, this is in all the universe. Mat-
ter and force cannot be separated, they are two aspects of an unity. Maxwell
actually resents such ideas and tries to amend Faraday:
[speaking of Faraday] ...He even speaks of the lines of force belonging
to a body as in some sense part of itself, so that in its action to
distant bodies it cannot be said to act where it is not. This, however,
is not a dominant idea with Faraday. I think he would rather have
said that the field of space is full of lines of force, whose arrangement
depends on that of the bodies in the field, and that the mechanical
and electrical action on each body is determined by the lines which
abut on it ([529] Maxwell, 1873).
7We will return to this issue in Section 3
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From a rational perspective, Maxwell’s argumentation is disappointing. To
sustain that Faraday should have said what he did not say amounts to the
vulgar strategy of substituting adverse observations for desired observations. If
the idea was dominant or not with Faraday is beside the point. The beliefs
of Faraday are of no importance, what matters are his arguments and Maxwell
chooses not to confront them but to hold to his own beliefs. This way of avoiding
adverse ideas contrasts with the otherwise careful and open-minded attitude of
Maxwell both as a philosopher and even more as a mathematician 8. We will
return to Maxwell’s philosophical views in Section 4.1, contrasting them with
Hertz’ ideas.
The tradition of natural philosophy to which Faraday adhered comes to an
abrupt end in Maxwell. For the sake of completeness it must be noted that
Faraday never criticised nor put down his idea on ray vibrations. It is advanced
as a hypothesis open to criticism, and there it stands, still today. It appears
that he never returned to the subject.
The foundation of Maxwell’s beliefs can be found in ([866] Maxwell, 1873)
where he discusses action at distance and writes
Now we are unable to conceive propagation in time, except either as
the flight of a material substance through space, or as the propaga-
tion of a condition of motion or stress in a medium already existing
in space.[...] If something is transmitted from one particle to another
at a distance, what is its condition after it has left the one particle
and before it has reached the other?
The belief (provisional in Maxwell) in the ether is clearly stated as the result of
a limitation by reduction to ideas that are part of our experience with matter,
but applied to inferred ideas such as (inter)actions. It represents a fear of ab-
straction (at the end a fear to reason) which is present for example in (Berkeley,
2017, 10 intro). This is the main hidden lemma of theoretical physics which is
of epistemic or philosophical character and consists in the rejection, in limine,
of ideas that can not be imagined (constructed with mental images of material
experiences). Faraday’s “vibrating rays“ could be easily ridiculed if taken liter-
ally. The rays are only a form of illustration of some aspects of an interaction;
imagining a vibrating illustration is a valid pedagogical tool, but it can hardly
be considered part of the Real (except as illustration). But the image facilitates
communication (and then acceptance) reaching those, as Kelvin for example,
that need a material support for their thoughts. The obstacle is not Physics, or
the Universe or the Cosmos, the obstacles are our own capabilities for reasoning
and our confidence in reason. Such a problem is not present in the construction
of classical mechanics.
Last, but not least, Maxwell’s introduces a new form of exploring possible
organisations of the Cosmos. The introduction of a Lagrangian for electro-
magnetic phenomena (the starting point of Maxwell’s research) is compared
8Recall for example the discussion on Ampère’s force ([509],[510], [526] Maxwell, 1873),
the derivation of the electromagnetic force inside a conductor ([598] Maxwell, 1873) or his
remarks about the limits of the fluid analogy ([574] Maxwell, 1873).
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Maxwell ([554] 1873) with the use of the same mathematical object by Lagrange
“the end of Lagrange was to bring dynamics under the power of the calculus[...]
our aim, on the other hand, is to cultivate our dynamical ideas“. Thus, Max-
well introduces mathematical analogies. If the idea of current, as explained by
Faraday, implies the movement of electricity, and we have an expression (due
to F. Neumann ([542-543] Maxwell, 1873)) for the energy involved in the in-
teraction between two circuits with electrical currents, then we can construct
the associated momentum (the electro-tonic state of Faraday (Par. 60 Faraday,
1839)) of the current as the derivative of the “kinetic energy“ (the energy in-
volved in the movement) with respect to the current. This fundamental quantity
is what in today’s language is known as the vector potential, A, and correspond-
ingly, its time derivative is a “force“, the electromagnetic force9, fem = − dA
dt
.
We will come back to the important details of this matter.
2.4 Poincaré’s proposed reorganisation of science
Poincaré’s attitude towards Electrodynamics contrasts with his important con-
tributions to Mechanics. He argues for the ether hypothesis from a conservative
standpoint (without it the description of phenomena would be more complic-
ated than what we are familiar with). Also, his mathematical arguments are
incorrect in several points:
And does our ether really exist? We know the origin of our belief in
the ether. If light reaches us from a distant star, during several years
it was no longer on the star and not yet on the earth; it must then
be somewhere and sustained, so to speak, by some material support.
The same idea may be expressed under a more mathematical and
more abstract form. What we ascertain are the changes undergone
by material molecules; we see, for instance, that our photographic
plate feels the consequences of phenomena of which the incandes-
cent mass of the star was the theater several years before. Now, in
ordinary mechanics the state of the system studied depends only on
its state at an instant immediately anterior; therefore the system
satisfies differential equations. On the contrary, if we should not
believe in the ether, the state of the material universe would depend
not only on the state immediately preceding, but on states much
older; the system would satisfy equations of finite differences. It is
to escape this derogation of the general laws of mechanics that we
have invented the ether.
That would still only oblige us to fill up, with the ether, the in-
terplanetary void, but not to make it penetrate the bosom of the
material media themselves. Fizeau’s experiment goes further. By
the interference of rays which have traversed air or water in motion,
9Note that the time derivative here is a convective, or “total“, derivative and not a partial
derivative.
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it seems to show us two different media interpenetrating and yet
changing place one with regard to the other.
We seem to touch the ether with the finger.
Yet experiments may be conceived which would make us touch it still
more nearly. Suppose Newton’s principle, of the equality of action
and reaction, no longer true if applied to matter alone, and that
we have established it. The geometric sum of all the forces applied
to all the material molecules would no longer be null. It would
be necessary then, if we did not wish to change all mechanics, to
introduce the ether, in order that this action which matter appeared
to experience should be counterbalanced by the reaction of matter
on something.
Or again, suppose we discover that optical and electrical phenom-
ena are influenced by the motion of the earth. We should be led
to conclude that these phenomena might reveal to us not only the
relative motions of material bodies, but what would seem to be their
absolute motions. Again, an ether would be necessary, that these
so-called absolute motions should not be their displacements with
regard to a void space, but their displacements with regard to some-
thing concrete.(Poincaré, 1913a, p. 147)10
But Poincaré realises that the ether is an intuition: “We seem to touch the ether
with the finger“ is the English translation of the French expression: “On croit
toucher l’éther du doigt“ which meas to understand intuitively.11
The first paragraph almost reproduces Maxwell’s argument (quoted above).
It is interesting to realise that when the ether was at last derogated, the oper-
ation was performed by switching to the other option given by Maxwell in his
alternative (the flight of a material substance), this is, by creating the photon
that, as Poincaré understands, must make some elements of the old physics (as
Poincaré calls it) persistent.
(Poincaré, 1913a, pp. 300–301) proposes a reorganisation of physics in terms
of “principles“ and he lists them:
1. Conservation of energy (Mayer’s principle)
2. Degradation of energy (Carnot’s)
3. Equality of action and reaction (Newton’s)
4. Relativity, according to which the laws of physical phenomena must be
the same for an stationary observer or for an observer carried along in
10Torretti (2007) quotes his own translation of the first two paragraphs and comments that
the mathematical insight of the second paragraph is wrong. We add that it was known to be
wrong to Gauss and the school of Göttingen as well as to Maxwell.
11There are at least two digital versions of this book. We quote the translation by Halsted
which is faithful to the French original version in this point as well as to printed versions.
There is another version translated by W.J.G. (Poincaré, 1913b) which reads: “The ether is
all but in our grasp“
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a uniform form of translation; so that we have not and cannot have any
means of discerning whether or not we are carried along in such motion.
5. Conservation of mass (Lavoisier’s)
6. (I will add) the principle of least action.
The application of these five or six general principles to the different
physical phenomena is sufficient for our learning of them all that
we could reasonably hope to know of them. The most remarkable
example of this new mathematical physics is, beyond question, Max-
well’s electromagnetic theory of light.[...]
This principles are results of experiments boldly generalized; but
they seem to derive from their very generality a high degree of cer-
tainty. In fact, the more general they are, the more frequent are the
opportunities to check them, and the verifications multiplying, tak-
ing the most varied, the most unexpected forms, end by no longer
leaving place for doubt. (Poincaré, 1913a, Original in French of
1905)
Poincaré establishes his principles (beliefs) from experience as he says. But the
experiences here implied are of two different kinds. On one side 1, 2, 5 and
perhaps 3 can be the subject of experimental tests, they come from empiria.
Actually, Lavoisier’s law was a falling belief at the time of his writings. In
contrast, the relativity and the least action principles come from the experience
of our practices, they are constructive principles (Margenau and Mould, 1957)
that come from habitus. Poincaré does not seem to be aware of the difference
between the empirical input (the observation) and our ideation.
2.4.1 The principle of relativity
In their epistemological appraisal of special relativity, Margeneau and Mould
(Margenau and Mould, 1957) analyse the principle of relativity from a philo-
sophical perspective. For these authors it is a constructive principle, and we
agree. They introduce two versions of the principle: the new and the old. Re-
ferring to the old they say: “Historically, relativity is associated with problems
arising out of the need to provide a reference for particle motion. The question
which philosophers have asked is: Should quantities like particle position, velo-
city and acceleration be referred to an absolute, primitively given spatial frame
of reference; or should the kinematic notions which fix the state of the particle
have meaning relative only to other particles?“ and later, they state “The mod-
ern form of the principle is not concerned with the status (primitive or defined)
of the concepts it treats, but rather with the extensibility of the axioms over the
range of individuals included in the axiomatic structure. It requires the elimin-
ation of special or preferred individuals. ’Individual’ here refers to membership
in any given or generated collection of constructs of a specified kind.“
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The principle of relativity appears in (Poincaré, 1913a; Margenau and Mould,
1957; Dingle, 1960b) as emerging from irrationality, this is, it is not mediated by
other beliefs but it appears as true to the elite that has been previously trained
in Newtonian mechanics, for it extrapolates the habitus of the Newtonian con-
struction. It is only very recently that we have surpassed the direct irrational
acceptance showing that it is a requirement of reason and of the principle of
reality (a bolder belief). If there exists something real which is the concern of
science, the real cannot depend on our decisions, as stated in Peirce’s paragraph
quoted above. By considering that the objective must be intersubjective we ar-
rived to NAP (Solari and Natiello, 2018). But NAP requires a mathematical
structure relating arbitrariness, the structure of a mathematical group.12
Although NAP was thought in terms of the description of the real with em-
pirical foundation, its significance overpasses it. If we consider a fundamental
theory as real (although not directly related to observations) the theory must
be free of arbitrariness as well, and since the consecutive applications of ar-
bitrary actions is an arbitrariness as well, the set of arbitrary elements must
be related by operations pertaining to a group. Poincaré’s relativity principle
can be viewed then as the requirement that the relation between symbols be
invariant (indirectly, that the concepts ideated from the empiria and mediated
by the rules of correspondence have invariant relations).
Margenau and Mould seek to escape from the problems of Special relativ-
ity by enlarging the set of arbitrariness the way Einstein did in the General
Theory of relativity Margenau and Mould (1957). The problem is then: Do
(approximately) inertial systems exist? If the idea of inertial systems were an
arbitrariness, then we should go along with Einstein. Otherwise, we should
restrain to label as arbitrary what is in fact an idealisation emerging from an
empirical result. If we conceive the motion of a reference system in relation
to absolute space or the ether, it is clear that the notion falls when we reject
both ideas. But as we have shown (Solari and Natiello, 2018) the idea of iner-
tial motion emerges from the concept of isolation, and absolute isolation is an
idealisation of empirical observations accessible to trained and untrained eyes.
Non-inertial motion can be measured. A key experiment related to the present
issues was performed using a ring interferometer and a rotating table (Sagnac,
1913). Michelson showed the effect of rotation of the Earth in the propagation of
light (Michelson, 1925; Michelson and Gale, 1925) and discussed why the exper-
iment could not account for the movement of Earth around the sun (Michelson,
1904). Sagnac (ring) interferometers are used regularly as inerciometers in aer-
ial navigation (Post, 1967).13Hence, approximately inertial is measurable and
12Margenau and Mould use the word group Margenau and Mould (1957) in at least two
forms: as equivalent to set (as in “this group includes many teachers“) and with the mathem-
atical meaning used in NAP (Solari and Natiello, 2018) (as in “transformation group“ or the
non-existent but frequently mentioned “Lorentz group“).
13Ironically, Sagnac’s experiment is used by relativists (for example (Malykin, 2000)) as
well as by defenders of the ether (e.g., (Silvertooth, 1989)) to confirm their theories, and there
is no contradiction in that because only pre-existing beliefs can be confirmed. The fact is
that the formula produced by “extending“ special relativity to slowly rotating systems and by
retaining the ether are just the same expression.
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inertial systems are an idealised category. Margenau and Mould have no right
to mix inertial frames and non-inertial frames in the same arbitrariness class, a
tradition that goes back (at least) to Mach Mach (1919, (II.VI.5, p. 232)) and
was criticised by Poincaré (Poincaré, 1913a, Ch. VII) using precisely the idea
of isolation.
3 Matter and electricity
From the earlier investigations on static electricity it was clear that there were
two kinds of materials: conductors and insulators. While in conductors the
static electricity was able to move, no such macroscopic displacement was pos-
sible in insulators. Electricity was therefore conceived as matter inside matter.
This is, either as a fluid (or two fluids) or as particles moving inside matter. In
the second conception, the particles were positive and negative, and it was later
assumed that they would move in opposite directions with equal velocities, an
image known as Fechner hypothesis (Assis, 1994, p. 52). These early images
still lurk behind some debates that oppose Lorentz’ force to Ampère’s force,
despite their difference being clarified by Maxwell (see below). Since electricity
was bound to matter, the force exerted within the electrical substance would
be transmitted to the wire that was constraining it. The concepts arising from
this matter-inside-matter picture led to the distinctions ponderable matter vs.
imponderable matter and mechanical force vs. electromotive force.
However, the movement of electricity (so conceived) within some materials
challenged the existing ideas of matter. It was Faraday who, at an early stage,
clearly understood the problem:
The view of the atomic constitution of matter which I think is most
prevalent, is that which considers the atom as a something material
having a certain volume, upon which those powers were impressed
at the creation, which have given it, from that time to the present,
the capability of constituting, when many atoms are congregated to-
gether into groups, the different substances whose effects and prop-
erties we observe. These, though grouped and held together by their
powers, do not touch each other, but have intervening space, other-
wise pressure or cold could not make a body contract into a smaller
bulk, nor heat or tension make it larger; in liquids these atoms or
particles are free to move about one another, and in vapours or gases
they are also present, but removed very much further apart, though
still related to each other by their powers. [...]
But it is always safe and philosophic to distinguish, as much
as is in our power, fact from theory; the experience of past
ages is sufficient to show us the wisdom of such a course; and
considering the constant tendency of the mind to rest on an
assumption, and, when it answers every present purpose,
to forget that it is an assumption, we ought to remember
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that it, in such cases, becomes a prejudice, and inevitably
interferes, more or less, with a clear-sighted judgment [...]
If the view of the constitution of matter already referred to be as-
sumed to be correct, and I may be allowed to speak of the particles
of matter and of the space between them (in water, or in the vapour
of water for instance) as two different things, then space must be
taken as the only continuous part, for the particles are considered as
separated by space from each other. Space will permeate all masses
of matter in every direction like a net, except that in place of meshes
it will form cells, isolating each atom from its neighbours, and it-
self only being continuous (Faraday, 1844, p. 284–286)(emphasis
added).
Faraday proceeds then to show that space cannot be conceived neither as an
insulator nor a conductor, hence the conception of matter was incompatible
with experimental phenomena. He then continues his exposition:
If we must assume at all, as indeed in a branch of knowledge like
the present we can hardly help it, then the safest course appears to
be to assume as little as possible, and in that respect the atoms of
Boscovich appear to me to have a great advantage over the more
usual notion. His atoms, if I understand aright, are mere centres
of forces or powers, not particles of matter, in which the powers
themselves reside. If, in the ordinary view of atoms, we call the
particle of matter away from the powers a, and the system of powers
or forces in and around itm, then in Boscovich’s theory a disappears,
or is a mere mathematical point, whilst in the usual notion it is
a little unchangeable, impenetrable piece of matter, and m is an
atmosphere of force grouped around it. (Faraday, 1844, p. 289–290)
Notice that the already quoted article by Maxwell ([529] Maxwell, 1873) pre-
cisely tries to amend Faraday adhering to the criticised theory. Faraday proceeds
further with this idea:
To my mind, therefore, the a or nucleus vanishes, and the substance
consists of the powers or m; and indeed what notion can we form
of the nucleus independent of its powers? all our perception and
knowledge of the atom, and even our fancy, is limited to ideas of its
powers: what thought remains on which to hang the imagination of
an a independent of the acknowledged forces? A mind just entering
on the subject may consider it difficult to think of the powers of
matter independent of a separate something to be called the matter,
but it is certainly far more difficult, and indeed impossible, to think
of or imagine that matter independent of the powers. Now the
powers we know and recognize in every phenomenon of the
creation, the abstract matter in none; why then assume the
existence of that of which we are ignorant, which we cannot
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conceive, and for which there is no philosophical necessity?
[...] (emphasis added)
In the view of matter now sustained as the lesser assumption, matter
and the atoms of matter would be mutually penetrable. As regards
the mutual penetrability of matter, one would think that the facts
respecting potassium and its compounds, already described, would
be enough to prove that point to a mind which accepts a fact for a
fact, and is not obstructed in its judgement by preconceived notions.
With respect to the mutual penetrability of the atoms, it seems to
me to present in many points of view a more beautiful, yet equally
probable and philosophic idea of the constitution of bodies than the
other hypotheses, especially in the case of chemical combination. If
we suppose an atom of oxygen and an atom of potassium about to
combine and produce potash, the hypothesis of solid unchangeable
impenetrable atoms places these two particles side by side in a po-
sition easily, because mechanically, imagined, and not infrequently
represented; but if these two atoms be centres of power they will
mutually penetrate to the very centres, thus forming one atom or
molecule with powers, either uniformly around it or arranged as the
resultant of the powers of the two constituent atoms; and the man-
ner in which two or many centres of force may in this way combine,
[...] (Faraday, 1844, p. 290–293)(emphasis added).
At a moment in time when one or two fluids and imponderable matter were
being discussed, Faraday’s views are marvellously bold. He regards as accidental
such concepts as shape, extension, etc., pertaining to the traditional view. For
him, the identity of matter relates instead to its “powers“, i.e., the different
possibilities of interaction and their associated fields. As stated before (see
(Faraday, 1855, p. 447) above), Faraday soon realised that this view allowed to
get rid of the ether.
Faraday’s views developed over a long period of time. By 1821 he had
written:
Those who consider electricity as a fluid, or as two fluids, conceive
that a current or currents of electricity are passing through the wire
during the whole time it forms the connection between the poles of
an active [voltaic] apparatus. There are many arguments in favour
of the materiality of electricity, and but few against it; but still it
is only a supposition; and it will be as well to remember, while
pursuing the subject of electro-magnetism, that we have no proof
of the materiality of electricity, or of the existence of any current
through the wire. (p. 212–213 Assis and Chaib, 2015, quote from
Faraday)
We cannot avoid to underline the philosophical attitude of Faraday, who is
making all possible efforts to avoid prejudice and to preserve understanding.
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Faraday is a philosopher and refers to himself as such. To our knowledge, he is
the last natural scientist to regard himself as a philosopher.
3.1 Following Ampère’s footprints
While the work by Coulomb considering electrostatic forces did not rise contro-
versies and was later incorporated in all theories of EM, the work by Ampère did
raise controversies, while it also was fundamental in the progression of EM the-
ories. A recent work (Assis and Chaib, 2015) informs us how research and con-
troversies about currents and their forces developed around 1820-1830, involving
colleagues/adversaries (producers of alternative views) all across Europe. Sci-
entists such as Ørsted, Faraday, Biot-Savart and Grassmann criticised Ampère’s
force between current elements. Most of the criticisms revolve around different
analogies with material entities (fluids or particles) that were favoured by one
or the other scientist. Grassmann pointed out some degree of arbitrariness in
Ampère’s assumption that forces between current elements were central (along
the line joining the elements). Most noticeably, Faraday only presented words
of caution, since he wisely entertained doubts.
Finally, Maxwell ([518-527] Maxwell, 1873) showed that a complete experi-
mental deduction of the force between current elements starting from the forces
between closed circuits was not possible. We add that the current element is
a mental segmentation of real current-carrying wires, and it is closer to meta-
physics than to physics since it cannot be physically realised. According to
Assis’ research, Ampère was criticised both for not considering electric particles
moving inside the conductor (Ørsted) and for considering them (Biot-Savart).
Actually, the core of the discussion was about which is the “correct“ analogy
with matter, be it moving charges, one or two magnetic fluids, atomic magnets
and so on. It is remarkable though, that the subtitle of Ampère’s contribution
was “Theory of Electrodynamic Phenomena, Uniquely Deduced from Experi-
ence“ an expression that illustrates how our hypotheses are hidden for our own
observation.
Despite the controversy with respect to the force between current elements,
the integrated force between closed circuits that carry currents presented by
Ampère still stands without objections. Indeed, the other alternatives to this
force (Grassman, Biot-Savart) yield the same result as Ampère’s ([518-527]
Maxwell, 1873).
3.2 The relational point of view
Work on the relational view was centred in Göttingen and followed the lead
of Carl F. Gauss who left his guidance in two short communications (bd.5 p.
602-626 and 627-629, Gauss, 1870). This view rests on the assumption that
electromagnetism is an interaction analogous to e.g., gravity, in that it can be
fully described as the mutual influence between charged particles, depending
on intrinsic and relative properties. This description is expressed by a “force”
(although of a different nature than e.g., the gravitational force) between pairs of
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particles, depending on the individual charges, relative distance, relative velocity
and relative acceleration. In particular, the dependence on velocity is discussed
in Maxwell’s Treatise, where it says in [851] that Gauss in July 1835 interpreted
as a fundamental law of electrical action, that: “Two elements of electricity in a
state of relative motion attract or repel one another, but not in the same way as
if they are in a state of relative rest”. Gauss suspended his work on EM by 1836
(his own account in (bd.5 p. 627-629, Gauss, 1870))14. Ten years later Gauss
will express the suspicion that the interaction does not reflect instantaneous
action at a distance but rather a delayed action at a distance (bd.5 p. 627-629,
Gauss, 1870).
Some of these relational efforts are reviewed by Maxwell in (v.2 Ch.XXIII
Maxwell, 1873) where forces advanced by Weber, Gauss, Riemann, Clausius and
Betti are discussed).
3.2.1 Weber’s force
Among the attempts just mentioned, Weber’s force F21 between charged particles
Weber (1846) is the one that has deserved most attention, being still discussed
in our days Assis (1994):
F21 =
q1q2
4πǫ0
−→r12
r312
(
1− r˙
2
12
2C2
+
r12 r¨12
C2
)
Here, F21 is the force on particle 2 due to particle 1, q1,q2 are the electric
charges,−→r12 = −→r2 − −→r1 is the relative position vector between the particles,
with length r12. The force involves the derivatives of this length. Weber’s
work settled the choice of units by relating this force to other known forces also
measurable with a dynamometer. The constant ǫ0 relates to static electricity
(where the derivatives of the distance are zero) and the constant µ0 relates
to magnetic forces. The ratio of these two forces relates to the quantity C2 =
(µ0ǫ0)
−1, later known as the speed of light and omnipresent in electromagnetism.
Maxwell has mixed opinions about Weber’s approach. On one hand, we
will see in Section 3.3 that he criticises instantaneous action at a distance in
favour of the “propagating medium” theory (we defer the discussion of this to
Section 4, advancing only that the criticism is not conclusive but expresses
just that two possible approaches could be pursued, and Maxwell pursues one
of them). On the other hand, Maxwell recognises in [552] that this approach
leads to conceptions that are “as beautiful as they are bold“, while in [856]
he notes that “Weber’s law, with the various assumptions about the nature of
electric currents which it involves, leads by mathematical transformations to the
formula of Ampère. [...] Weber’s law is also consistent with the principle of the
conservation of energy” and “Weber’s law will explain the induction of electric
currents.“
14Soon later, Wilhelm Weber, his friend and main experimental mind in the research, was
expelled out of Göttingen following the protests in favour of the (old) liberal constitution.
Weber was one of the “Seven of Göttingen“. He lost then his laboratory and the daily contact
with Gauss.
28
Let us consider in detail the insights behind Weber’s force. The force ex-
presses instantaneous action at a distance. Further, it is a central force obeying
Newton’s principle of action and reaction. These two assumptions were current
in those times (although Gauss, Riemann, Betti and Lorenz suspected other-
wise) and were not put to test. Also, for zero relative velocity Weber force
reduces to Coulomb’s force between charged particles.
One of the goals of Weber was to incorporate the forces between currents
as studied by Ampère15 and Faraday. Weber assumed that the current within
a conductor responds to the fact that positively and negatively charged (point-
like) particles move within the conductor with certain relative velocity. Ori-
ginally, positive and negative charges were supposed to have opposite velocities
of equal size –what is called the Fechner hypothesis (p. 52, Assis, 1994)–, but
Weber’s framework does not depend on this hypothesis (Ch. 4.2, Assis, 1994) to
describe Ampère’s force or Faraday’s induction law. In short, Weber’s force is
the simplest relational central force of instantaneous action that satisfies Cou-
lomb’s, Ampère’s and Faraday’s laws under the assumption that current consists
of electrically charged (point like) particles in relative motion16. Weber’s elec-
trical particles were supposed to exist within matter and to be imponderable
(weightless), as opposed to usual (ponderable) matter.
Weber’s mechanicist view of electricity was the current theory around 1850.
It came to coexist with Maxwell’s theory some 15 years later, while after 1885
Maxwell’s theory (as understood by his followers) was dominating. A serious
difficulty with Weber’s approach was the impossibility to unify light and electri-
city, something that Maxwell’s theory was able to achieve (v.2 Ch.XX, Maxwell,
1873). However, electrical waves were first advanced within Weber’s framework.
3.2.2 Franz Neumann’s contribution
Ampère’s force was a fundamental expression for further developments by the
EM community. In its most symmetric form it reads
F = −µ0
4π
I1I2
˛
1
˛
2
x1(l1)− x2(l2)
|x1(l1)− x2(l2)|3 (dl1 · dl2)
=
µ0
4π
I1I2
˛
1
˛
2
(
∇x 1|x|
)
x=x1(l1)−x2(l2)
(dl1 · dl2)
where I1,I2 are the currents through conductors 1 and 2. The second line
suggests that there is an energy involved in producing the configuration of
P =
µ0
4π
I1I2
˛
1
˛
2
1
|x1(l1)− x2(l2)| (dl1 · dl2) (1)
15Actually, action and reaction could not be put to test, since it cannot be deduced from
Ampère’s force, as noted by Maxwell in the Treatise, [527].
16The idea of conduction current as the movement of charged particles will return in Section
4.2, where we discuss that it is more restricted than the view of Maxwell and it enters in conflict
with experimental data.
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This form, introduced by F. Neumann (Neumann, 1846), was one of the start-
ing points in Maxwell’s theory. In contrast to Weber, Neumann did not rest
on a material image, but rather abducted the expression because it served to
organise and integrate Faraday’s induction with Ampère force. The integrated
expression, eq.(1), is a safer starting point than Weber’s force since it requires
a lesser number of hypothesis (usually analogies) about the unknown.
Eq.(1) admits at least two readings. The energy can be regarded as the
potential energy that results from starting in a situation where the circuits do
not interact and subsequently bringing one circuit to the proximity of the other,
preserving the currents in each of them (in other words it is, a mechanical en-
ergy). Also, the expression can be considered to be the kinetic energy associated
to the electrical currents. In formulas,
P =
˛
2
I2A(x2(l2)) · dl2
A(x2) =
µ0
4π
I1
˛
1
1
|x1(l1)− x2|dl1 (2)
F. Neumann is credited with the first introduction of what today is called the
vector potential, A.
It is worth to keep in mind that these developments use the space as an
auxiliary element since all expressions are relational. The same can be said of
Weber’s force.
3.2.3 Kirchhoff and electrical waves
In 1857 Kirchhoff(Kirchhoff, 1857) advanced a model for the propagation of elec-
tricity in wires, combining existing and new elements. He started by computing
the electromotive force associated to charges and currents within a wire inspired
in Weber’s theories. Further, he combined these results with Ohm’s law (namely
that current in a wire is proportional to electromotive force) and the continuity
equation (i.e., that spatial variation in current corresponds to time-variation in
charge, also called the conservation of charge), thus obtaining a wave-like equa-
tion for the current (again, current here is identified with charges in motion).
Apparently, Weber was simultaneously working on the same lines at the time
(Assis, 2000, 2003), although his results were published some years later. The
resulting wave-like equation came to be called the “Telegraph equation”.
As much as this wave behaviour was encouraging, its differences with light
were only too large. A wire is filled with electrically active particles (this is the
current view about wires still today), both positive and negative and in roughly
the same amount if the wire is to be electrically neutral as a whole, thus offering
a tangible electrical medium for the waves to propagate (more or less like the
pressure waves originated in a string musical instrument). Light, on the other
hand, was expected to exist in vacuum where there is no tangible medium at
all. A possible escape way at the time was to endow the vacuum with electrical
properties, by resorting to the ether (see Section 4), an idea that was already
circulating in different forms.
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3.2.4 Lorenz and Delayed Action at a Distance (DAD)
The danish physicist Ludvig Lorenz presented a series of works on light propaga-
tion (Lorenz, 1861, 1863, 1867) in the 1860’s. Especially in his memory of 1867
he expresses discomfort with the ether hypothesis, which had only been use-
ful to “furnish a basis for our imagination” (p. 287). He sets up to develop
an ether-free theory of light, something that he achieves by introducing delays.
Electrodynamics could be an action at a distance theory, but not an instant-
aneous one. This was a dramatic novelty, that is still not completely grasped.
Retarded action was being discussed at the time. Indeed, in Maxwell’s Treatise
(Ch. XXIII) the theories of C. Neumann, Betti and Riemann (all published in
1867-68) are briefly discussed, along with a criticism by Clausius. Curiously,
Lorenz far-reaching contribution is not mentioned in that part of the Treatise.
It appears in Art. [805] as a novel theory of light propagation, without mention
of the delayed action at a distance. Maxwell ends his recollection by noting
that Lorenz’ conclusions are “similar to those of this chapter, though obtained
by an entirely different method” (Maxwell also points out that his own theory
was published earlier, in 1865).
The proposal of delayed action opens up for different possibilities regarding
how this delay could take place. Within an emission theory, light generates at
the source, it travels through space and reaches the detector, somewhat like
sound waves, or even a projectile. This idea goes back at least to Huygens
and Newton and it was supported by Maxwell, Clausius and almost all of Max-
well’s followers. It rests strongly in the assumption of a propagating medium.
Consequently, this view attempts to describe delays with information about the
location of the source at the departing time and that of the detector at the
(later) detection time. However, this quantity is not universal, it takes different
values for different observers and it cannot be used “as is” to gain understanding
about light propagation (see below). Outside the emission theory, other possib-
ilities open up. The Göttingen school advocated a different view, better adapted
to Faraday’s intuitions (Faraday, 1855, p. 447) based on an objective measure
of the delay involved in the interaction, as it will be presently exemplified. A
more detailed discussion about delayed action at a distance is given in Appendix
A.
3.2.5 C. Neumann, Betti, Riemann and Clausius’ criticism
Three more attempts were made to incorporate delayed action at a distance
by Gauss’ followers Betti(Betti, 1867), Riemann(Riemann, 1867) and Carl Neu-
mann (Neumann, 1868). These scientists tried to justify in different forms the
use of an objective form of the delay, aiming to formulate the propagation law
guessed by Gauss (the wave equation) and mathematically enunciated by Max-
well (1865) and Lorenz (1867). 17
17Lorenz’ and Maxwell’s propagation of electromagnetic disturbance arrive to the same
final equation, the difference being in the foundations. Maxwell uses the displacement current
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The fate of Neumann’s theory is better known as a consequence of the po-
lemic with Clausius discussed by Archibald and Assis (Archibald, 1986; Assis,
1994). Archibald observes that “These exchanges illuminate some of the points
that are at issue when an instantaneous action at a distance model is replaced
by one where the action is propagated with finite velocity. In so doing, they
illustrate two views of the role of mathematics in physical science, showing that
the twentieth century is not the first time that mathematical model offering
good results have posed problems for those who seek a more intuitive picture”.
Neumann explicitly proposes a potential “travelling” from source to detector.
The locations and times of the interaction must satisfy the relation
|xd(t)− xs(t)| = C(t− t0) (3)
(d for detector and s for source) being t0 the time for the electromagnetic dis-
turbance in the source. This relation, common to Lorenz and the whole Göttin-
gen school, is universal (independent of observers or choices of reference frames);
hence, all observers compute the same “velocity”, C =
1
(µ0ǫ0)
, which is Weber’s
measured relation between static and dynamic electricity, a quantity for which
it makes no sense to consider a frame of measurement. However, Neumann’s
focus is in the action of a delayed potential. He insists that the travel is similar
but not identical to that of light (Neumann, 1869).
Clausius (Clausius, 1869) criticism of Neumann (and also of Riemann in
this particular topic) is based on an emission theory. Clausius claims that the
“distance” between source and detector must satisfy
|xd(td)− xs(ts)| = C(td − ts).
This expression does not have the universal character of eq.(3). In the terms
of NAP, Clausius proposal equates a subjective quantity |xd(td)− xs(ts)| to an
objective one (Solari and Natiello, 2018). The laws of physics are thus made
to depend on the arbitrariness of the selection of a reference frame since for
an arbitrary change from a frame to another moving with relative velocity v
we would have |xd(td) − xs(ts)| 7→ |xd(td) − xs(ts) + v(td − ts)|. This view
cannot be sustained unless an absolute reference frame is introduced: the ether
or absolute space. The substantialist view18 at the basis of the emission theory
of light has never been questioned, but it persists beyond any doubts about its
appropriateness.
Further, it was later realised that this view forces to deform our concep-
tions of space and time in order to compensate for the arbitrariness. Clausius’
based on the ether to obtain what is now called Ampère-Maxwell’s law,∆A = −µ0j +
1
C2
∂2A
∂t2
while Lorenz obtains ∆A−
1
C2
∂2A
∂t2
= −µ0j using the delays, explicitly avoiding to invoke
any ether (j is here the current density, i.e., the current per unit volume).
18Substantialism: The doctrine that behind phenomena there are substantial realit-
ies (Oxford dictionary). In Newton the space is the place of objects. Now it is
taken further since it becomes the place of impending actions as well. See for example
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-theories/#5.2
32
criticism does not go further than that: Neumann’s programme is regarded as in-
adequate since it does not conform to Clausius’ views. It suggests without proof
that the ether-based emission theory would be appropriate and final. Rather
than a search for the foundations and an attempt to refine or improve the cri-
ticised work, the criticism dismissed the proposal on improper grounds.
Maxwell presented his views on C. Neumann’s theory in articles [863] and
[866] of the Treatise:
Besides this, the velocity of transmission of the potential is not,
like that of light, constant relative to the aether or to space, but
rather like that of a projectile, constant relative to the velocity of
the emitting particle at the instant of emission.
It appears, therefore, that in order to understand the theory of Neu-
mann, we must form a very different representation of the process
of the transmission of potential from that to which we have been
accustomed in considering the propagation of light. Whether it can
ever be accepted as the ’construirbar Vorstellung’19 of the process
of transmission, which appeared necessary to Gauss, I cannot say,
but I have not myself been able to construct a consistent mental
representation of Neumann’s ’ theory. (art [863])
In the theory of Neumann, the mathematical conception called Po-
tential, which we are unable to conceive as a material substance, is
supposed to be projected from one particle to another, in a manner
which is quite independent of a medium, and which, as Neumann has
himself pointed out, is extremely different from that of the propaga-
tion of light. In the theories of Riemann and Betti it would appear
that the action is supposed to be propagated in a manner somewhat
more similar to that of light. (art [866])
Apparently, Maxwell tries to regard C. Neumann’s potential as a material sub-
stance, without success. As we have previously seen (Section 2.3), Maxwell’s
epistemic view blinds him when considering Faraday’s ray theory which is pre-
cisely what Neumann’s has built in formulae.
Riemann was closer to Lorenz in that he considered only necessary to intro-
duce the wave-propagation20 without resting on analogies or images of matter
or the space. Remarkably, he offered some possibilities in which his hypothesis
could be thought in material terms
This supposition can be fulfilled in various ways. Let us assume,
for instance, that the conductors are crystalline in their smallest
particles, so that the same relative distribution of the electricity is
19Maxwell quotes from Gauss’ letter to Weber (bd.5 p. 627-629, Gauss, 1870) an expression
of difficult translation: “construirbare Vorstellung” (possibly meaning “constructible repres-
entation”, or simply “a representation that can be carried out”).
20To be fair, we should note that the proposal is earlier than Maxwell’s, although it was
published at a later time. In the Treatise, article [862], Maxwell dismissed Riemann’s approach
referring to Clausius’ criticism.
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periodically repeated at definite distances which are infinitely small
compared with the dimensions of the conductors
Unlike Lorenz’, Riemann’s theory did not incorporate light polarisation.
Clausius criticises Riemann in two points, the first of them being the same as
his critic of Neumann. The other is a procedural issue. Riemann’s calculations
hold only if the delay is characterised by a relation such as eq.(3), but it is unclear
what Riemann meant since he uses various notations to describe distances along
the work. Betti’s work attempted to provide a different framework for Riemann’s
ideas. Clausius’ criticism of Betti’s work focuses on general formal properties
of series expansions, but he did not discuss if such criticism was relevant for the
issue in question.
The work of Lorenz mentioned above also considers a delay compatible with
eq.(3). Remarkably, his work appeared contiguously after Riemann’s work in
the same issue of the Poggendorff Annalen (1867)21 but it was not criticised
at that time, nor afterwards. It is surprising that neither Lorenz’ nor other
non canonical view about light propagation has ever been considered as an
alternative.
The odd circumstance of three papers around the same idea and a weak
attempt of refutation coming soon after, move us to consider the historic envir-
onment of these events. Carl Neumann was the son of Franz Neumann and had
the greatest admiration for Riemann (Jungnickel and McCormmach, 2017). In
turn, Riemann became a friend of Betti during a visit of the latter to Göttin-
gen. Later Riemann visited Betti in Italy. Riemann was an assistant to Weber
during 18 months around 1849 and Weber is one of his recognised influences 22.
By the year 1866, Hannover and Prussia (“Göttingen and Berlin”) enter in war.
Riemann fled Göttingen for Italy because of the war, and he died there the same
year. The war lasted until 1868 when Hanover was annexed as a province of the
new empire. Clausius was born in Prussia, studied in Berlin, taught physics at
the Royal Artillery and Engineering School in Berlin and was Privatdozent in
Berlin University. In 1870 he organised an ambulance corps during the Franco-
Prussian war and was wounded in battle. It can be said that the battle of ideas
was held under the emotional atmosphere of the battles for the reunification of
Germany. By 1871 the German Empire was proclaimed.
21Riemann’s manuscript was presented in 1858 but published in 1867 (after his death).
Betti comments on this as “ ...supponendo che la corrente consista nel movimento delle due
elettricità positiva e negativa che vanno contemporaneamente nel filo in direzioni opposte, [...]
Questo concetto della corrente elettrica tutto ideale è poco in armonia con ciò che si conosce di
essa, e pare che Riemann non ne fosse soddisfatto, avendo ritirato l’articolo dalla Segreteria
dell’Accademia, ed essendosi astenuto dal pubblicarlo”, namely that Riemann possibly was
unsatisfied with his hypothesis about the nature of electric current. Clausius (referring to the
alleged “error” he discussed) conveys his own version as “I believe that Riemann subsequently
convinced himself of this error, and that this was the reason he withdrew his paper”, thus
ignoring both Lorenz’ work (sustaining basically the same result than the criticised works)
and the reasons offered by Betti (in the same paper that Clausius also criticises), friend and
collaborator of Riemann in this matter.
22See https://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Riemann.html
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3.2.6 Revisions
The activity on a relationist view of electromagnetism ceased by 1868 except for
a reprint of C. Neumann’s work and the immediate reaction of Clausius. More
than a half century later, Moore and Spencer (and collaborators) researched the
subject in a series or articles (Moon and Spencer, 1954, 1956, 1960; Moon et al,
1989b,a, 1991, 1994)) in which they considered the main experiments that sup-
port the currently accepted theory. Their 1960 book (Moon and Spencer, 1960)
presents the systematic revision and comparison. The result of the revision
is that, at the time (1960), there was no experimental evidence to prefer the
Maxwell-Lorentz-Einstein views to the Delayed Action at Distance theory.In the
same terms of Dingle (Dingle, 1960b) they find that the constancy of the speed
of light remains a conjecture since the moment it was proposed by Einstein (p.
257, Moon and Spencer, 1960).
In front of possible criticism from an intuitive point of view they state: “But
we can hardly expect intuitive ideas to hold for light. Light is not a wave in a
medium and is not a particle: it is a unique phenomena unlike anything else in
nature. To expect to visualise this unique phenomenon in terms of mechanistic
pictures of water waves and bullets is indeed naive” (p.256).
In page 251 Moon and Spencer write an example of synchronisation of clocks
using light assuming the Galilean formulation. They write: “Thus we have
an operational method of establishing an universal time, subject of course to
the assumptions that the space is euclidean and that ’velocity of light’ is a
meaningful expression. In the advent of space ships and the establishment
of colonies in other planets, such a synchronisation of clocks would be highly
desirable” they proceed then to consider the differences between reflected an
re-emitted light. They also easily show that, within their “postulational basis”
for the discussion it is not possible to synchronise clocks in terms of special
relativity.
It is then relevant to notice the so called “flyby anomaly” (of the Pioneer and
other spacecrafts) (Bilbao et al, 2014; Bilbao, 2016), where two tracking systems
were used: one with a re-emitting device and the other with a reflector. The
systems disagree in values associated to the relativistic correction of time. These
observations are anomalies for the standard electromagnetism but regularities
(actually, predictions) for the relational electromagnetism. Certainly, there are
other a posteriori explanations for the anomalies, but the ad hoc explanations
cannot account for the fine detail as the relational view does. Needless to say,
these articles have received little or no attention from the physics community.
3.3 Maxwell
In Maxwell, as well as in all other developers of EM, a basic assumption about
the behaviour of electrodynamics systems is that the electrodynamic forces ex-
erted on matter behave in the same way as the previously known mechanical
forces. In particular, whatever external force that is required to keep a system
at rest is taken to be equal and of opposite sign to the internal force generated
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by electrodynamic interactions (and that, if no compensated, would alter the
static equilibrium). In this way, by looking at external forces only, it is possible
to learn something about the electrodynamic system.
Today it is believed that “external“ forces such as mechanical resistance to
deformations or frictional forces in the “contact“23 In any case, it was expec-
ted that isolated electrodynamic systems should have some sort of conserved
electrodynamic energy and electrodynamic forces should be associated to the
time-variation of some “momentum“.
We may identify a series of abductions that increasingly organised the exist-
ent knowledge, starting from F. Neumann who realised that the force between
closed circuits had an associated energy. Helmholtz and Thomson (Thomson,
1851) associated this energy to the mechanical energy (the ability of generating
mechanical work). Indeed, Helmholtz states,
The entire electromotive force of the induced current, generated
by a change of position of a magnet relative to a closed con-
ductor, is equal to the change which thereby takes place in the
potential of the magnet towards the conductor, when the latter is
traversed by the current (p. 157, Helmholtz, 1853)(emphasis added)
In formulae, the electromotive force, E ,is
E = − d
dt
(
µ0
4π
I1
˛
1
1
|x1(l1, t)− x2(l2, t)|dl1
)
(4)
This was the starting points that Maxwell adopted to develop his contribu-
tions to EM.
Despite the stories usually told in physics textbooks, Maxwell did not con-
sidered electricity as a fluid, except for illustration purposes. Following Faraday,
Maxwell was certain that electricity (whatever it is) had the ability of moving
when associated to conductors, but he restrained from further hypothesis ([552],
Maxwell, 1873). Then he proceeded to conceptualise P (2) no longer as a po-
tential energy but rather as the electrokinetic energy, assimilating the currents
Ii with velocities. Then, by analogy with Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics,
he would write
Ai =
δP
δIi
The variation δIi included the possibility of changing the locus of the cable
(additionally, he formally extended the expressions to conductors not necessarily
produced as cables). The quantity Ai is then the electrical momentum following
the standard wording in Lagrange’s mechanics. He then tried to determine
experimentally whether the electrical momentum had an associated mechanical
momentum as well, concluding that they were completely decoupled ([574-575],
23These quoted words from the usual language hide assumptions that we are barely aware
of. We speak freely of contact between bodies, we may detect a difference between contact
and no contact, but still today it is not a trivial question to relate the detected difference to
the atomic constituents of each body and their interactions.
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Maxwell, 1873). Thus, the energy (and then the Hamiltonian), corresponding
to two pieces of matter is the addition of the energy of the ponderable matter
and the electrokinetic energy ([571], Maxwell, 1873), being the electrokinetic
energy independent of the motion of the ponderable matter. The electromotive
force (4) is then the external force required to balance the internal force that is
necessary to maintain the current ([576], Maxwell, 1873).
It is important to realise at this point that physical hypotheses play two
different roles. Some of them, like the fluid hypothesis in Maxwell, are pedago-
gical devices directed to facilitate the perception and explanation of abducted
relations. These kind of hypothesis can be changed without changing the ab-
duction. For example, we can think of massless electrical particles instead of
fluids, as Weber did, and nothing is changed in our expressions. Other kind
of hypotheses force us to modify the equations involved in the theory. In the
present situation, the decoupling of the kinetic energies (the electrokinetic one
and the one arising from the movement of matter) results in that some energy
terms have been considered to be identically zero24. Such a hypothesis cannot
be dropped or modified without a complete reworking of the results. In particu-
lar, currents cannot be read as qv, being v a subjective velocity (a velocity that
changes with our choice of reference frame), maintaining Maxwell’s ideation.
The second, and best known, contribution of Maxwell derives from his con-
viction that forces of action at distance were not really needed in order to
describe EM phenomena ([59-60] [552], Maxwell, 1873). In practice, Maxwell
never went that far, large portions of his work assume instantaneous action at
a distance. Early in his treatise he indicates that one of his goals is to pursue
the hypothesis “... that electric action is not a direct action between bodies at
a distance, but is exerted by means of the medium between the bodies...“ ([60],
Maxwell, 1873).
Using Gauss formula, and the generalised expression corresponding to A (2)
Maxwell produces
A(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
V
(
j1(x1(y, t), t)
|x1(y, t))− x|
)[
∂x1
∂y
]
d3y (5)
∆A(x, t) = −µ0j1(x, t)
here, x1(y, t) stands for the location of a small volume, d3y, of ponderable mat-
ter at time t with initial condition x1(y, 0) = y, and ∆ is Laplace’s operator25.
24When current is involved, Maxwell’s belief is that “electricity“ is moving, some way or the
other. Following the Lagrangian formulation of mechanics, in [578] he calls y˙ the variables
associated to currents, while y is the conjugated variable (other authors will relate y to the
transport of net charges). Further, he realises that the mechanical variables x, x˙ corresponding
to ordinary matter are not coupled to y˙ and that the energy associated to currents (the
electrokinetic energy) is an homogeneous quadratic function of the currents. Further, in
[632-8] the relationship between magnetic and electrokinetic energy is presented, thus closing
the circle with C. Neumann’s formulation, since electrokinetic energy relates to the vector
potential A and the magnetic field. Hence, the whole electrodynamic energy of a material
system is obtained as the sum of electrostatic and electrokinetic energy.
25Actually, Maxwell did not write the integral form. He moved intuitively from the ex-
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Maxwell proposed that a current corresponding to the variation of the polar-
isation of the dielectric should be added to the equation, so that j1 = j
g
1 + j
d
1
would be 26 the sum of the galvanic current, jg1 , and a current arising from
the variation of the induced polarisation. In the case of observer (detector)
and source at relative rest, jd1 = Kǫ0
∂E
∂t
. Here K is a dimensionless constant
characteristic of the dielectric, the specific inductive capacity, that takes the
minimum value of K = 1 in vacuum and it is also 1 (or slightly above) in air
([52], [60],[75] Maxwell, 1873). Further E = −∂A
∂t
− ∇V (also for the case of
relative rest) is the the electromotive force (V stands for an undetermined po-
tential function in (eq. B, [598], Maxwell, 1873), with v = 0). It is interesting
to notice that Maxwell focused his attention on the differential (derived) form
∆A(x, t) = −µ0
(
j1(x, t)− ǫ0K ∂∂t
(
∂A
∂t
+∇V )) which is not entirely equivalent
to the integral form. The equivalence holds only if the (unstated) boundary
conditions are properly satisfied. If we, alternatively, fix our attention on the
integral form, we realise that for the convergence of the integral expression it
is required that the current decays at infinity faster than 1|x|2 , a condition that
∂A
∂t
does not satisfy. This means that the ideation is slightly inconsistent, it is
actually an improper form of proposing that the equation governing the vector
potential is
✷A = −µ0(j1 + ǫ0K∇V ) (6)
where ✷ = ∆− (Kµ0ǫ0) ∂2∂t2 is the D’Alembert operator. Later, Maxwell would
seek solutions to this equation.
3.3.1 Maxwell on reference systems
Maxwell’s Treatise on Electromagnetism (Maxwell, 1873) is a complex work. In
particular, the equations are not self-contained. The reader is expected to follow
and understand the derivations. Quite often the notation is simplified in excess,
resulting in expressions that do not apply to the general case. For example,
dropping a gradient contribution in the electromotive force renders several final
equations only apt for the use in the case of closed circuits. The handling of the
space is not transparent either. Partial derivatives with respect to time occur
and, unfortunately, they are indicated with the same symbol
d
dt
as the “total“
(convective, following the body) derivative.
In Art. [600] Maxwell discusses the invariance in form of the electromotive
force with respect to the choice of reference system. The problems of notation
pression in cables (wires) to the expression in three-dimensional matter arrangements. The
expression of the electromagnetic momentum can be transformed by a coordinate change to
A(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
V (t)
j1(y, t)
|y − x|
d3y
we have preferred the formulae (5) because it displays more readily the transformation prop-
erties of A.
26In standard textbooks this is called the Ampère-Maxwell law. However, the contribution
from jg1 is not from Ampère, but rather from F. Neumann who inspired his developments in
Ampère’s force.
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are particularly acute in [598-600]. The general setup is that A(x, t) is allowed
to have a more general (and undefined) form than in eq.(2). The location of the
secondary cable x2(l, t) is allowed to change in time and so is the location and
current of the primary, but since there is no explicit expression for A this will be
reflected as the partial derivative in time
∂A(x, t)
∂t
that collects all the changes
in time due to changes in the primary circuit. Maxwell centred his attention
in how
∂A(x, t)
∂t
must change under a change of reference system (that could
comprise rotations and translations with respect to the original system). To
avoid complexities, and since this is sufficient for our discussion, we will address
only the translational case (i.e., where the coordinate axes in a given inertial
system are parallel to the corresponding axes in another system). Instead of
stating Maxwell’s result for
∂A(x, t)
∂t
, we collect all the hypotheses introduced
in [600] and rewrite his result in terms of invariance of form.
Maxwell’s invariance theorem LetA(x, t) be the electromagnetic momentum,
in terms of the position x with respect to a coordinate system L, and E the
electromotive force (introduced in [597]). Maxwell computes in (eq.B, [598],
Maxwell, 1873)
E = v × (∇×A)− ∂A
∂t
−∇ψ (7)
where v =
dx
dt
is the velocity of a point on the (moving) secondary circuit with
respect to L and ψ(x, t) is an undetermined scalar function of the form ψ =
V +A · v where the first term is still undetermined and the second arises from
intermediate steps in the derivation of eq.B. Maxwell explains further that “We
shall find, however, that when we know all the circumstances of the problem, we
can assign a definite value to ψ, and that it represents, according to a certain
definition, the electric potential...“27
Theorem (Maxwell’s invariance theorem):
Assume that for a moving system of coordinates x = x′ − ut it holds that
A′(x′, t) ≡ A(x, t) 28 and consider the resulting expression for the electromag-
netic momentum. Then the value of the electromotive force at a point x does
not depend on the choice of reference system if and only if V (x, t) also trans-
forms as V ′(x′, t) ≡ V (x, t) (also as a “body of invariable form“ in motion). In
formulae, E ′(x′, t) = E(x, t), where
E ′(x′, t) = (v+u)×(∇×A′(x′, t))− ∂A
′(x′, t)
∂t
−∇ (V ′(x′, t) +A(x, t) · (v + u)) .
27In [69-73] Maxwell defines the electrostatic potential V such that the electrostatic field
satisfies E = −∇V .
28Maxwell refers to this expression as: “the theory of the motion of a body of invariable
form“. For any property of matter, this relation is immediate.
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Proof : First we note that by straightforward vector calculus identities,
Maxwell’s electromotive force can be restated as
E = −∂A
∂t
− (v · ∇)A−∇V
Correspondingly, in the new coordinate system we have
E ′(x′, t) = (v + u)× (∇×A′(x′, t))− ∂A
′(x′, t)
∂t
−∇ (V ′(x′, t) +A(x, t) · (v + u))
= −∂A
′
∂t
(x′, t)− ((v + u) · ∇)A′ −∇V ′(x′, t).
Subsequently, under the present assumption A′(x′, t) ≡ A(x, t) we may rewrite
∂A′(x′, t)
∂t
=
∂A(x, t)
∂t
|x=x′−ut − (u · ∇)A
leading to
E ′(x′, t) = −∂A(x, t)
∂t
|x=x′−ut − (v · ∇)A−∇V ′(x′, t).
Given that V ′(x′, t) ≡ V (x, t), the result follows.
In Maxwell’s own version the gradient of A · v is “absorbed“ in ψ. We make
the distinction in order to safely keep track of the different contributions. Art.
[601] states “It appears from this that the electromotive intensity is expressed by
a formula of the same type, whether the motions of the conductors be referred to
fixed axes or to axes moving in space, the only difference between the formulae
being that in the case of moving axes the electric potential ψ must be changed
into ψ + ψ′.“ (being ψ′ = −A′ · u). The correction to ψ is mandatory since
the relevant quantity for the computation of E is in fact V . ψ’s numeric value
depends on the choice of reference system. In the appendix to Chapter IX, J.
J. Thomson –the curator of the third edition– indicates: “...It does not appear
legitimate to assume that ψ in equations (B) represents the electrostatic poten-
tial when the conductors are moving, for in deducing those equations Maxwell
leaves out a term − d
ds
(A · v) since it vanishes when integrated round a closed
circuit...“.
While the force is invariant under changes of inertial systems (as any New-
tonian force must be) it leads to confusion when the “potential energy“ is misid-
entified with Coulomb’s potential energy (as Maxwell’s readers did). In such
event, the force does not longer satisfy the invariance requisites of Newtonian
forces. As we have shown, what can be identified with Coulomb’s potential
energy is V in the above theorem.
3.3.2 Electromagnetic Energy
The Treatise considers in Art. [85] the potential energy associated to building
up a given arrangement of charges, relating it to the electrostatic potential.
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It returns to this topic in [630-31], restating it as properties belonging to the
electric field. An important difference is that the computation in [85] was inten-
ded to be performed only in the regions of space occupied by charged matter.
It can be formally extended to all space, assuming that the density of charge
outside the (bounded) region of charged matter is zero. However, the computa-
tion in [630-31] must extend to all space, otherwise a compensating term on the
boundary of the integration region is required. In formulae and using modern
notation
1
2
ˆ
U
ρ(x)V (x)d3x =
1
2
ˆ
U
ǫ0(∇ · E)V d3x
=
1
2
ˆ
U
ǫ0
(∇ · (EV ) + |E|2) d3x
=
1
2
ˆ
U
ǫ0|E|2d3x+ 1
2
ˆ
U
ǫ0∇ · (EV ) d3x
=
1
2
ˆ
U
ǫ0|E|2d3x+ 1
2
ˆ
∂U
ǫ0(EV ) · nˆ d2s
where U is the region of space where the charge density ρ is supported. We
have used the relation ∇ · E = ρ
ǫ0
. Using Gauss’ theorem, the last term in the
third equation is restated as a surface integral over the boundary ∂U of U .
Only when this surface integral is zero, we can identify the ρV integral with the
|E|2integral. For bounded charge distributions the potential and field behave in
such a way that the surface integral vanishes at infinity.
Maxwell extends in Art. [631] the validity of this result to any electric field.
Thomson indicates in a footnote (v.2 p.271, Maxwell, 1873) that the deduction
holds only in the electrostatic case. He adds that in the general case the energy
should be considered as that contained in the polarisation of all the dielectric
(ether included). In such a form it extends to all sources of polarisation.
Other forms of energy such as the magnetic energy are put by Maxwell in
the same form, as integrals of the square of the fields over all space. A step that
would have pleased Faraday.
4 The ether
At the very end of the Treatise, in the last Article, [866], and after discussing
action at a distance very much following Clausius, Maxwell states:
But in all of these theories the question naturally occurs : –If
something is transmitted from one particle to another at a distance,
what is its condition after it has left the one particle and before
it has reached the other? If this something is the potential energy
of the two particles, as in Neumann’s theory, how are we to con-
ceive this energy as existing in a point of space, coinciding neither
with the one particle nor with the other? In fact, whenever en-
ergy is transmitted from one body to another in time, there must
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be a medium or substance in which the energy exists after it leaves
one body and before it reaches the other, for energy, as Torricelli
remarked, ’ is a quintessence of so subtile a nature that it cannot
be contained in any vessel except the inmost substance of material
things.’ Hence all these theories lead to the conception of a medium
in which the propagation takes place, and if we admit this medium
as an hypothesis, I think it ought to occupy a prominent place in
our investigations, and that we ought to endeavour to construct a
mental representation of all the details of its action, and this has
been my constant aim in this treatise.
Far from proving the existence of the ether, the paragraph establishes a prom-
ising program of study that rests on Maxwell’s substantialism, for energy must
leave one body to reach the other as if it were matter, which indeed, appears to
be almost the case if we are to believe that energy is contained in matter, this
is, localised in the space occupied by matter. This conception of energy and
matter is a far cry from Faraday’s leading vision, but it must be conceded to
Maxwell that his intuition deserved to be studied.
The arguments in favour of the ether or against action at distance never
went further that those by Maxwell. These arguments are the consequence of
an axiom of the proposed ideation: we must conceive the unknown by means of
analogies with matter accessible to the intuition. Cf. with Kelvin’s mechanical
intuition (Thompson, 2011, p.235) discussed in Subsection 2.1.
In all, Maxwell’s equations are supported by action at a distance (present
in Faraday’s induction law and Coulomb’s electrostatic force), F. Neumann’s
energy of a system of currents (which also rests in action at a distance) and
in the polarisation current, an ingredient that operates even in empty space,
where there are no charge or current carriers to support it. It is only here that
the ether enters in Maxwell’s theory, quite early in the Treatise and basically
because Maxwell could not conceive an alternative explanation. Even when
Faraday opened to alternative possibilities, Maxwell felt forced to rectify him
(Cf. Subsection 2.3). In the next Subsection we will se how Hertz tried to rectify
what he regarded as faulty in Maxwell’s conception.
4.1 Hertz as a theoretician
While Hertz’ most famous contributions come from his experiments, he wrote
two papers where he exposed his views on Maxwell equations. In (pp- 19-
21 Hertz, 1893) he explains his motivations (referring to Maxwell’s theory) as
follows:
(p. 19) “Casting now a glance backwards we see that by the
experiments above sketched the propagation in time of a supposed
action-at-a-distance is for the first time proved. This fact forms the
philosophic result of the experiments and, indeed, in a certain sense
the most important result. The proof includes a recognition of the
fact that the electric forces; can disentangle themselves frommaterial
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bodies, and can continue to subsist as conditions or changes in the
state of space. The details of the experiments further prove that the
particular manner in which the electric force is propagated exhibits
the closest analogy with the propagation of light; indeed, that it
corresponds almost completely to it. [...] Since the year 1861 science
has been in possession of a theory which Maxwell constructed upon
Faraday’s views, and which we therefore call the Faraday-Maxwell
theory. This theory affirms the possibility of the class of phenomena
here discovered just as positively as the remaining electrical theories
are compelled to deny it.“
(p. 20) “I have not always felt quite certain myself of having
grasped the physical significance of his statements. Hence it was not
possible for me to be guided in my experiments directly by Maxwell’s
book. I have rather been guided by Helmholtz’s work, as indeed may
plainly be seen from the manner in which the experiments are set
forth. But unfortunately, in the special limiting case of Helmholtz’s
theory which leads to Maxwell’s equations, and to which the exper-
iments pointed, the physical basis of Helmholtz’s theory disappears,
as indeed it always does, as soon as action-at-a-distance is disreg-
arded. I therefore endeavoured to form for myself in a consistent
manner the necessary physical conceptions, starting from Maxwell’s
equations, but otherwise simplifying Maxwell’s theory as far as pos-
sible by eliminating or simply leaving out of consideration those
portions which could be dispensed with inasmuch as they could not
affect any possible phenomena. This explains how the two theor-
etical papers (forming the conclusion of this collection) came to be
written.“
(p. 21) “To the question: “What is Maxwell’s theory?“. I know
of no shorter or more definite answer than the following:– Maxwell’s
theory is Maxwell’s system of equations. Every theory which leads
to the same system of equations, and therefore comprises the same
possible phenomena, I would consider as being a form or special case
of Maxwell’s theory;[...]“
Hertz’ operation is of an epistemological character. Actually, his reading of
Maxwell-Faraday contradicts Faraday’s writing, for in Faraday there was a du-
ality between action and the (naive) view of matter while in Hertz actions
disentangle themselves from the bodies to meet the requirements of Hertz epi-
stemology. Also, the last quoted sentence from p. 19 implies to ignore Lorenz’
theory (Lorenz, 1867) (which is mentioned by Maxwell in ([805] Maxwell, 1873)).
Hertz confesses not to understand the physical significance of Maxwell’s state-
ments. This raises the question about Hertz’ idea of understanding which is
greatly influenced by Helmholtz (who was his Ph.D. advisor and life-long pro-
tector). Hertz needed to see “pictures“ of the real based upon the elements he
has learned to trust: “a mechanistic conception within which natural phenomena
were to be explained by the action of mechanically moved matter“ (Schiemann,
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1998). This view represents an extraordinary departure from Faraday’s philo-
sophical attitude, since Faraday was willing to change his most basic building
blocks if this were necessary, while in Hertz we see the opposite attitude: the
persistence of beliefs.
The general idea that transpires from the quoted pages is that it is pos-
sible (p. 21) to separate the process of construction of a theory, what we have
called the “rules of correspondence“ used in the construction, from the theory’s
mathematical content. Instead, the theory has to be provided with what Hertz
called interpretation, a prescription about how to apply the theory to experi-
ments. Along this lines, Hertz offers four interpretations of Maxwell’s equa-
tions, including Maxwell’s, Helmholtz’ and his own and preferred one, the most
consistent with the idea of the ether. Indeed, he attempts to recast Maxwell’s
work in terms of his views about the ether.
Π
φ
Γ
Theory
Observations
New
observations
φ
Γ
Theory=
Equations
New
observations
Figure 1: The epistemological change introduced by Hertz.
Hertz’ departure from the traditional scientific epistemology is illustrated
in Figure 1. Let Π be a projection of the observable into a symbolic language
(say mathematics), φ the logical elaboration and Γ the interpretation. The
left panel describes the traditional scientific construction, where it is required
that Π ◦ Γ = Id and Γ ◦ Π = Id′, in other words that no distortions on both
theory and observations is introduced by the interpretation Γ with respect to
the correspondence Π applied in the construction. The thin red arrows show
the flow of falsity(Lakatos, 1978a). In the traditional epistemology of science
(say that of Faraday), inconsistencies between predictions and new observations
flow back all the way through the diagram triggering an improvement in the
construction: Falsity can force us to change our view of the world. The right
panel describes Hertz’ view, where the flux of falsity cannot affect the ideation
since the ideation is suppressed. This conception represents a weakening of
the conditions for a theory to be acceptable, allowing the scientist to change
interpretations constrained only by their predictive success.
Hertz’ deep epistemological change has been highlighted by D’Agostino:
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“...by separating the mathematical structure of a theory from its modes of repres-
entation he [Hertz] has profoundly challenged the conception of a physical theory
as an indivisible unity of the two – a conception accepted by Maxwell and other
nineteenth century mathematical physicists.“ (D’Agostino, 1968; D’Agostino,
2004).
Maxwell exposed his programme to address Faraday’s ideas and experiments
in the first few pages of (Maxwell, 1856), also reviewed in (D’Agostino, 1968).
He advocates care in formulating models, so as not to fall in “...that blindness
to facts and rashness in assumption which a partial explanation encourages.“
(p. 155-156, Maxwell, 1856). Further, Maxwell introduces the idea of physical
analogies, (p. 156), similar to what we may call “working hypotheses“, finally
declaring his goal: “...to present the mathematical ideas to the mind in an
embodied form“ (p. 187), namely integrating the mathematics with its physical
significance.
The discussion about the four interpretations of Maxwell’s equations aims to
retain the equations while removing their foundations. Action at a distance was
regarded as an obstacle. Since Maxwell’s and Helmholtz’ views are supported by
it, a new view was required. The equations (which were good enough since they
led to the wave equation) had to be detached from the scaffolding used in their
construction. Hertz believed that Maxwell started from mechanics and ended
with the ether (actually an oversimplification), and sought a fully ether-based
interpretation instead.
For Hertz, action at a distance was not to be taken into account as a possib-
ility and hence the potentials A, V were undesirable. Instead, he regarded the
electric and magnetic fields (E,B) as the state of the ether (p. 251), therefore
deserving a central importance in physics. Moreover, in Hertz’ interpretation
Maxwell did not consider bodies in movement (p. 247) (despite any average
reader of Maxwell’s Treatise can verify that this statement is false) and proceeds
to incorporate the movement under his famous hypothesis that the ponderable
matter drags the ether (p. 242). Forcing his system to correspond with the
traditional (Galilean) view, he incorporates terms representing this effect (eq.
3, p. 251). The equations obtained with the new interpretation are regarded as
new, but they are actually identical to what is called equation (B) in (Maxwell,
1865, 1873), now under a new interpretation.29
29It is remarkable that this mistake has persisted for centuries in standard textbooks. It
might have originated in the fact that Heaviside was the first to write Maxwell’s equations in
their modern form (around 1885, (p. 429, Heaviside, 2011)), for the special case of bodies
at rest. However, the most likely origin is Maxwell himself who wrote under the title “The
propagation of electromagnetic disturbance“: “Let us next determine the conditions of the
propagation of an electromagnetic disturbance through a uniform medium, which we shall
suppose to be at rest, that is, to have no motion except that which may be involved in
electromagnetic disturbances.“([783] Maxwell, 1873). Is Maxwell thinking in the possibility of
motion with respect to absolute space? He is certainly considering a non moving ether, where
the reference for the movement remained in his brain.
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4.2 H. A. Lorentz
The dutch physicist Hendrik Lorentz introduced a number of ideas that have
propagated to the present day. In a work from 1895 (p. 2, Lorentz, 1895), he
explains part of his scientific trajectory, that first developed along action at a
distance for some time. He informs us that “This I have shown in a previous
paper [13], in which I admittedly have derived the equations of motion from
actions at a distance, and not, what I now consider to be much easier, from
Maxwell’s expressions.“ And later (p.3) he states “The influence that was suffered
by a particle B due to the vicinity of a second one A, indeed depends on the
motion of the latter, but not on its instantaneous motion. Much more relevant
is the motion of A some time earlier, and the adopted law corresponds to the
requirement for the theory of electrodynamics, that was presented by Gauss in
1845 in his known letter to Weber [18]“30.
The views of Lorentz constitute a progression. In 1892 Lorentz considered
the advantages of Hertz approach:
M. Hertz ne s’occupe guère d’un rapprochement entre les actions
électromagnétiques et les lois de là mécanique ordinaire. Il se con-
tente d’une description succincte et claire, indépendante de toute
idée préconçue sur ce qui se passe dans le champ électromagnétique.
Inutile de dire que cette méthode a ses avantages.(p. 368, Lorentz,
1892)
In this work he considers both the case of the ether being dragged by the pon-
derable bodies (Chapter II) and the case in which the bodies move in the ether
without dragging it (Chapter IV). He also considers the hypothesis of the elec-
tric fluid (§31). Following Hertz and Fizeau, Lorentz assumes (p. 1, Lorentz,
1895):
...that ponderable matter is absolutely permeable, namely that at
the location of an atom, also the aether exists at the same time,
which would be understandable if we were allowed to see the atoms
as local modifications of the aether.
However, Lorentz conceives an ether at “rest“. He later adds:
That we cannot speak about an absolute rest of the aether, is self-
evident; this expression would not even make sense. When I say
for the sake of brevity, that the aether would be at rest, then this
only means that one part of this medium does not move against the
other one and that all perceptible motions are relative motions of
the celestial bodies in relation to the aether.(p. 2, Lorentz, 1895)
We have to observe that the notion of “perceptible motion“ is not reconcilable
with an imperceptible ether. The struggle to conciliate the concept of space with
electromagnetism continues in Lorentz. It has been asserted that Lorentz’ ether
30Lorentz’ reference [18] corresponds to (bd.5 p. 627-629, Gauss, 1870).
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is some form of (absolute) space (see e.g., (p. 172, Ritz, 1908)). Lorentz’ ether
hypothesis contradicts that of Hertz (and also that of Stokes (Stokes, 1845)) in
which the ether was dragged by ponderable bodies. Indeed, in (Lorentz, 1887)
Lorentz criticises different alternatives of ether drag.
While he admits that the Michelson andMorley experiment (Michelson and Morley,
1887) (failing to detect a velocity of the earth relative to the ether) represents
an objection to his view, he proceeds to reformulate his view incorporating the
now famous contraction in the direction of movement (§89–§92, Lorentz, 1895).
Lorentz attitude corresponds to the “persistence of belief“ in the terms of Peirce:
The existence of the ether is never questioned, the propagation of light cannot
be conceived without an emission theory and a propagating medium. In this re-
spect, Lorentz retains the view of Maxwell and Hertz and in so doing he opposes
Faraday’s view of vibrating rays. However, Lorentz’ ether cannot be reconciled
with an ether that is dragged by matter. In this issue concerning the ether
“at rest“ or not at rest, Lorentz remains close to Maxwell’s Art. [783] of the
Treatise, while Hertz advanced a different view.
In his version of Maxwell’s theory Lorentz leaves behind Maxwell’s practice
of the epojé. Thus, where Maxwell sustained the doubts resulting from several
undecidable possibilities, Lorentz adopts the hypotheses.
The writing of Lorentz presents an evolution towards an authoritative form
in contrast with that of Ampère, Faraday, Maxwell and Hertz, to mention just
a few. Lorentz late writing is much closer to current textbooks where a doctrine
is being transmitted without providing clues on how the author has established
her/his results.31
4.2.1 The current
As a central issue in his career, (Lorentz, 1892, 1895, 1899), Lorentz adopted the
early view of electrical particles. It is remarkable that this idea of Gauss relates
to the ether-free formulation and is central to, for example, Weber’s theory
(Weber, 1846), considered in Section 3.2. In paragraphs §75 to §80 in (Lorentz,
1892), he considers the force on a ponderable body that moves through the ether
with velocity v relative to it (for the precedents and history of the force see (p.
143, Assis, 1994)). In §75 the total current is introduced,
J = j +
∂D
∂t
(8)
(in modern notation), being
∂D
∂t
Maxwell’s displacement current (in vacuum
D = ǫ0E). Lorentz proposes j = ρv, this is the product of the density of charge
times the velocity relative to the ether, an expression present in the current
theory of electromagnetism and now denominated Lorentz’ current. He then
proceeds to find the force following Maxwell’s idea regarding the variation of
the energy with respect to a virtual displacement of the particle. Because of the
31Actually, Maxwell would disagree with us, since this is Maxwell’s criticism of
Ampère([528], Maxwell, 1873), but in comparison to Lorentz, Ampère is transparent.
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relevance of the expression of the Lorentz’ force we will address its derivation
in a dedicated subsection.
The Lorentz current is introduced in all textbooks of physics that we know
about. However, it deserves to be questioned from an experimental point of
view. A bounded density of charge implies that charges can be obtained in
infinitesimally small amounts (just by integrating this density in appropriate
small domains), this is, in an amount smaller than any given one, for example,
smaller than the charge of the electron. Nevertheless, the work by Millikan
(Millikan, 1913) persuaded physicists that the charge of an electron is the min-
imum value for electric charge, the quantum of electricity. If the charge density
must integrate in all domains to a multiple of the electron charge, it cannot be
continuous. Following this line of thought to arbitrarily small distances, it fol-
lows that charges and the electron in particular must be point-like objects and
that charge density is unbounded. That charged particles are not point-like is
an experimental observation that is in itself inconsistent with the assumptions
made by Lorentz in his deduction, but furthermore, Lorentz’ construction is in-
consistent with our understanding of conductors and electron states in conduct-
ors after quantum theory. As Einstein perceived (Einstein, 1940), present field
theories and quantum theory are not compatible, the efforts made to forcibly
put them together added insurmountable difficulties that can only be dealt with
by destroying the mathematical building (Natiello and Solari., 2015) on which
they rest.
4.2.2 Lorentz’ force
The changes introduced by Hertz, Lorentz and others to Maxwell equations32
(despite still naming the modified equations after Maxwell) make Maxwell’s
(modified) equations unsuited to describe cases of induction that appear in
the foundational experimental background of the theory. Experiments such as
Arago’s disk ([81], Faraday, 1839) or the rotating magnet of Faraday ([217–],
Faraday, 1839; Assis, 1994; Munley, 2004) cannot be understood using Maxwell’s
(modified) equations. This matter constitutes today the so-called “exceptions
to the flux rule“ (referring to the Faraday-Maxwell induction law) (Ch. 17-2,
Vol. ii, Feynman et al, 1965). We are instructed then that “the correct phys-
ics is always given by the two basic laws ...“ being the first of the two “basic
laws“ the expression of Lorentz force. The resolution of this misunderstanding
has been given in (Munley, 2004). Using Faraday-Maxwell’s flux law and fol-
lowing Faraday’s and Maxwell’s original insight, rather than the modified view
proposed by Lorentz to accommodate for the ether, Munley accounts for the ro-
tating magnet and shows how the discrepancy was built when the signification
of the original flux law was altered to its present status.
32The modification consists in accepting Maxwell equations in the cases of bodies without
relative motion and then proposing different extensions based upon different ideas regarding
the ether for the case of bodies in motion (no longer relative motion, but with respect to the
ether). Motion is then considered with respect to the ether although no experimental basis
exists for it. All the motions considered in Faraday’s experiments and Maxwell formulae are
relative motions.
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The force experienced by a charged point-like particle by the influence of the
electric and magnetic fields still plays today a central role in electrodynamics.
However, its origin is seldom discussed (cf., e.g., (Jackson, 1962), where the
Lorentz’ force is mentioned on p. 3, 260, 553, etc. (3rd. edition), but it is
never derived from basic principles). It comes as a piece of received knowledge
without a sound insertion in the theory.
The force is presented in (§74-§80 (Ch. IV), Lorentz, 1892) under the fol-
lowing assumptions:
• The state of the ether is defined by the associated fields created by matter.
There is a distinguished body on which the force will be computed. The
body is a rigid solid. The charge density is nonzero only at the location
of each body and it adds up to a smooth function ρ, with its associated
Lorentz current in the case of the moving body. No other current in the
distinguished body is considered. The ether acts through the fields E and
B, satisfying Maxwell’s equations.
• It is assumed that each point that takes part in the electromagnetic move-
ments is known and determined by our cognition of all the particles of the
system and the electric field in all the points of the space (§75 f. (Ch. IV),
Lorentz, 1892).
• The force with which the ether acts on the distinguished body (with charge
density ρ0) within this electrically active matter is computed by an applic-
ation of the variational method (with roots in Lagrange and D’Alembert),
inspired in Maxwell. A virtual displacement with respect to the ether is
proposed for the particle, leaving the rest of the matter without modific-
ation (hence, the displacement can be thought of both as relative to the
ether as well as relative to the rest of the bodies). The variation is not
completely calculated mathematically (despite it being possible). Rather,
some steps are circumvented with arguments pertaining to the ether, as
e.g., the restricted variation in §78 and its subsequent effects in §80 b .
The final result reads
FL =
ˆ
d3x ρ0 (E + v ×B)
There are a number of epistemological issues around this result. First, Lorentz
departs from Maxwell in the proposal of a current. While Maxwell leaves as an
undecided question the fundamental nature of the current, Lorentz postulates
that the only possible current for a charged particle is given by its velocity rel-
ative to the ether at rest. Second, Lagrange’s method rests in allowing arbitrary
variations compatible with the boundary conditions. The peculiar variation pro-
posed by Lorentz, automatically restricts its validity. The force can be such only
in a situation where the proposed variation would be the most general possible.
Indeed, the mechanical force computed by Maxwell (eq. C, [619], Maxwell,
1873) is more general than Lorentz’ expression. But perhaps the more striking
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innovation is to put and end to the separation between guessing and conjectures
and mathematics. In Newton, Maxwell and all the precedent physics, there is a
time for synthetic propositions, usually inspired in experimental observations,
while the theory develops further through analytic propositions performed with
the correctness and consistency of mathematics. Not only Lorentz engages in
interpretations as Hertz but he goes beyond them by substituting mathemat-
ical steps with his imagination on the behaviour of the ether, see (§80, Lorentz,
1892)
Lorentz Lagrangian reads
L = 1
2
ˆ (
1
µ0
|B|2 − ǫ0|E|2
)
d3x
=
1
2
ˆ
[A · J ] d3x− 1
2
ˆ
ρV d3x
where (A, V ) are the potentials, (j, ρ) the measurable current and charge dens-
ities, J as in eq.(8), while (E,B) stand for the electric and magnetic fields. The
integral extends over the region occupied by the system. These quantities are
related by Maxwell’s modified equations
∇ · B = 0
∇ · E = ρ
ǫ0
∇×B = µ0
(
j +
∂E
∂t
)
(9)
∇× E = −∂B
∂t
∇×A = B
−∂A
∂t
−∇V = E
The fourth and sixth equations differ from Maxwell’s original formulation in
that the present version holds only for stationary problems and rigid circuits.
In this way, the equations can no longer describe Arago’s problem and the like
(see above). From the expression of the electromagnetic Lagrangian an action,
A can be formally written as
A =
ˆ
dtL = 1
2
ˆ
dt
[ˆ (
1
µ0
|B|2 − ǫ0|E|2
)
d3x
]
=
1
2
ˆ
dt
[ˆ
d3x [A · J ]−
ˆ
d3x ρV
]
where in all cases the limits of integration have been absorbed in the support
of the integrands. We defer to Appendix B a more technical derivation of the
electromagnetic force from the Lagrangian stated above, rendering explicit the
restrictions that lead to the Lorentz’ force. In short, Lorentz proposal leads to
FL =
ˆ
d3x [(ρv)×B + ρE]
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if we consider the material current to be
j = ρv
where v is a velocity relative to the ether and we use by habit the Lagrangian
formulation of mechanics.
In Lorentz’ original context the Lagrangian is not invariant under changes
of reference systems and the velocity involved is the velocity with respect to the
frame of reference or the ether. We can derive by Lorentz’ method the force
exerted by the ether on all the system as
FL =
ˆ
d3x [(ρv)×B + ρE]
and for the force exerted by the ether on the particle 0
F 0L =
ˆ
d3x [(ρ0v0)×B + ρ0E]
Thus, in Lorentz, the ether (or the space, after suppressing the material ether)
exerts a force on every electric body which adds up to some non necessarily
zero amount. It is also well known that Lorentz’ force does not conform the
action-reaction principle (II 26-2, Feynman et al, 1965)(Ch. 6, Assis, 1994).
Lorentz will later (eqs. Ia-Va, Lorentz, 1899) summarise electrodynamics
with five equations, namely the four Maxwell’s equations described from a ref-
erence system fixed to the ether at rest plus Lorentz’ force. Basically, this
idea rests on the assumption that the electromagnetic fields are given: they are
properties of the ether that suffer no influence from the particle subject to FL.
The action above, expressed as A = 12
´
dt
[´
d3x [A · J ]− ´ d3x ρV ] has an
interesting symmetry related to the now famous Lorentz transformations. Let
X = (a, b) (with a ∈ R3and b ∈ R) be a four vector such as (A, V
C2
) or (j, ρ)
or (x, t), where C is Weber’s constant (later known as the “speed of light“).
Further, let T be the transformation
TuX =
(
γ(a− uCb) + (1− γ)uˆ× (a× uˆ), γ(b− u · a
C
)
)
(10)
where u is a dimensionless parameter with |u| < 1, γ = 1√
1− u2 and uˆ =
u
|u| a
unit vector. The Lorentz transformation TLu of a four vector valued function
F of the four vector space-time, X = (x, t), reads
TLuF = TuF (ξ, τ)
(ξ, τ) = T−uX
and leaves invariant the action A. Hence, it represents a symmetry of the
action. The discussion of this symmetry and its possible meaning corresponds
to the contribution of Einstein. Further, notice that if j would represent the
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current associated to a particle at rest in some reference frame, (which is zero in
Lorentz’ conception) its representation in another frame as given by a Lorentz
transformation, would be
TLu(j, ρ) = Tu(j, ρ)(ξ, τ)
(ξ, τ) = T−uX
which disagrees with the Lorentz current (there is a factor γ in excess). In other
words, the construction is inconsistent with special relativity and only accept-
able under the new epistemology that has no place for constructive consistence.
4.3 Mathematical picture of DAD
Having reached the point of experimental refutation of the idea of the ether, we
feel obliged to collapse what originates from this idea. Thus, from the compet-
ing theories of propagation, ether and DAD, we must turn to the latter again
and see whether Lorentz’ current and force belong to it. Especially in the case
of the force since it was “derived” assuming at the same time displacements with
respect to the complement of the probe in the universe and with respect to the
ether. The work is imminently mathematical and is presented in Appendix B
We show in the Appendix that the following elements fit harmoniously in unity:
Faraday’s insight regarding field interactions, Gauss’ insight on retarded action,
Maxwell’s Lagrangian approach, equations and transformation, Lorenz’s delays,
C. Neumann’s minimal action approach, Lorentz’ Lagrangian and force, the
principle of action and reaction and Newton’s equations. But above all, in the
epistemological side, Newton’s approach and motto: hypotheses non fingo ap-
pears as superior, for the production of a theory than Helmholtz-Hertz pictorial
method which needs the support of physical hypotheses.
4.4 Einstein contribution and his view of the ether
Einstein’s 1905 work (Einstein, 1905) represents the final metamorphosis of the
electromagnetism initiated by Faraday and Maxwell. As Dingle (Dingle, 1960b)
observes, (accepted) electromagnetism was not revised later and continues to
be the same since then. Einstein’s equations for electromagnetism are directly
taken from Lorentz (Lorentz, 1904) although the velocity participating in the
equations will change its meaning to “velocity with respect to a frame of ref-
erence“. In so doing he adheres to the epistemological view of Hertz: to keep
the equations while producing a new interpretation. The motivation for a new
interpretation is clearly written as:
It is known that Maxwell’s electrodynamics—as usually under-
stood at the present time—when applied to moving bodies, leads to
asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena.
Take, for example, the reciprocal electrodynamic action of a magnet
and a conductor. The observable phenomenon here depends only on
the relative motion of the conductor and the magnet, whereas the
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customary view draws a sharp distinction between the two cases in
which either the one or the other of these bodies is in motion. For
if the magnet is in motion and the conductor at rest, there arises
in the neighbourhood of the magnet an electric field with a certain
definite energy, producing a current at the places where parts of
the conductor are situated. But if the magnet is stationary and the
conductor in motion, no electric field arises in the neighbourhood
of the magnet. In the conductor, however, we find an electromot-
ive force, to which in itself there is no corresponding energy, but
which gives rise—assuming equality of relative motion in the two
cases discussed—to electric currents of the same path and intensity
as those produced by the electric forces in the former case.
which is the opening paragraph of the 1905 work33. In the second paragraph,
after rejecting absolute motion and the idea of the ether as reference, he will
introduce “The principle of relativity“ (without mentioning Poincaré), a con-
jecture that is raised to the level of principle. He also introduces the second
(explicit) postulate of the theory: “that light is always propagated in empty
space with a definite velocity c34 which is independent of the state of motion of
the emitting body“.
As it frequently occurs in physics, Einstein’s explicit postulates have to be
complemented with implicit postulates, that are taken for granted without even
mentioning them. Among them we count in this case “there exists something
real we call space“, “there is something real that we call relative velocity“ –this
one in particular after the opening paragraph– and “light is something emitted“
(and in this respect it is body-like). These three postulates are by 1905 hidden
in the habits and other forms of irrational acting of scientists. We have already
explained (Solari and Natiello, 2018) that space emerges from the construction
of the child and it is an auxiliary concept in mechanics. Much later, Einstein
will become more explicit about his view of the ether
33Einstein’s discussion of the symmetry is not clear. First, we cannot know what it is meant
by “electrodynamics—as usually understood at the present time—“, but most likely it refers to
the electrodynamics as described by Lorentz. Certainly, there is no asymmetry in Faraday’s
experimental work and in Maxwell’s original formulation. The movement they considered is
relative motion and the results were checked experimentally. However, a description of the
situation using subjective coordinates with reference to either the magnet or the conductor
and breaking down the interaction by dissociating the source from the detector (despite the
fact that there can be no induction without both conductor and magnet) may have inspired
the expectation by Einstein of a “field arising [or not, depending on the choice of subjective
reference] in the neighbourhood of the magnet“ although there is no reason for it since the
terms of the relation are not equivalent. Einstein will not come back to this matter in the
paper but only to the issue of relative motion. In Appendix B we show that the sort of
symmetry of form Einstein was seeking is present in the DAD, i.e., in electromagnetism after
suppressing the ether. Further, also the assertion “there is no corresponding energy“ cannot
make sense outside the subjective description since the phenomenon is rooted in the relative
motion and the energy involved in the electromotive force and induced current is always there,
regardless of the observer and his/her viewpoint.
34In this work we use C throughout for the associated electromagnetic quantity, i.e., C2 =
(µ0ǫ0)−1 .
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When we speak here of aether, we are, of course, not referring
to the corporeal aether of mechanical wave-theory that underlies
Newtonian mechanics, whose individual points each have a velocity
assigned to them. This theoretical construct has, in my opinion,
been superseded by the special theory of relativity. Rather the dis-
cussion concerns, much more generally, those things thought of as
physically real which, besides ponderable matter consisting of elec-
trical elementary particles, play a role in the causal nexus of physics.
Instead of ‘aether’, one could equally well speak of ‘the physical qual-
ities of space’. Now, it might be claimed that this concept covers
all objects of physics, for according to consistent field theory, even
ponderable matter, or its constituent elementary particles, are to
be understood as fields of some kind or particular ‘states of space’.
(Einstein, 1924)
Rather than description tools, the fields become entities of “real” existence,
particular ’states of space’.
This is a remarkable paragraph since it goes back to Hertz’ idea of electro-
magnetic fields as the “state of the ether“, just changing the word ether by space.
Actually, despite the usual claims about Special Relativity –for example (p.354,
Torretti, 2007)–, only the materiality of the ether has been suppressed, Poin-
caré’s vision of the ether, already presented (Section 2.4), lives in this paragraph.
It is the fundamental need, introduced by the new epistemology, of sustaining
a mechanistic (material) view of actions what leads to consider the space as an
immaterial ether.
Einstein postulates that the Lorentz transformations (named in honour of
Lorentz but introduced as such by Einstein), which leave the electromagnetic
action invariant (and correspondingly, are associated to equivariant transforma-
tions of Maxwell equations), correspond to changes of reference frames in relative
motion. Since neither Einstein nor Poincaré discussed the fundamentals of the
Relativity principle (there is no critical motion towards the fundamentals, the
principle is a conjecture, an intuition in them) there are no restrictions imposed
to the transformations. Einstein will then postulate the Lorentz transformation
as a proper substitute for the Galileo transformations.
Let us now study Einstein postulates from the point of view of the No
Arbitrariness Principle.
4.4.1 A metaphysical symmetry
We shall first make explicit the equivariance (too often called covariance) in
Maxwell’s equation. To simplify the exposition we will introduce the vector and
scalar potential in the Lorentz gauge
E = −∂A
∂t
−∇V
B = ∇×A
✷(A,
V
C2
) = −µ0(j, ρ)
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Where ✷ is D’Alembert operator, defined in eq.(6). The third equation estab-
lishes a relation between two four-vectors and since
TLv ◦✷ = ✷ ◦ TLv
the four-vector (A,
V
C2
) changes under the Lorentz transformation in the same
form than the four vector (j, ρ), hence (A,
V
C2
) and (j, ρ) are equivariant un-
der a Lorentz transformation35. This is the sort of invariance of form sought by
Einstein. We shall recall that a change of reference frame corresponds to a frame
that moves relative to the original one. Let us now suppose there is a neutral
current (no accumulation of static charges is present) going through a cable, and
the cable is not moving in the frame where we have measured the current (let’s
say that the galvanometer is part of the circuit, as it usually is). Consider now
a second observer in motion with respect to the galvanometer and the circuit,
with some velocity v. According to Einstein’s view, the charge and current cor-
responding to the second observer can be obtained by transforming the original
four vector (j, 0) with a Lorentz transformation. However, no method of meas-
urement has ever been offered for moving observers (independent of the fields).
How do we measure a current while flying by? We are forced to conclude at this
time that the charge and current so obtained are metaphysical. The symmetry
does not exist except in our construction. They are only tautologies obtained
through formulae in the theory that cannot be physically verified. On the con-
trary, DAD is not metaphysical, it relates measurable quantities in two systems
(source and detector, even if in relative motion) among each other.
4.4.2 Collapsing Einstein’s Special Relativity theory.
In section 2 we have discussed the collapse of a reasoning that is produced
when a contradiction is found. The idea is present in the form of reductio ad
absurdum in mathematics. As we have seen, some of the postulates of Einstein
are not explicit. We will focus our attention in the concept of “relative velocity“
which is mentioned on intuitive grounds at several places of the 1905 work.
The concept makes sense in relational mechanics as a result of the invariance of
relative position and time differences (Solari and Natiello, 2018), however, if we
change the structure of space-time, we open for the possibility of destroying the
concept. The real character of the relative velocity is expressed in mathematical
terms by its invariance with respect to reference frames. As Peirce would have
put it: the real does not depend on opinions. This is to say, that there should
be an operation “⊖” that produces the relative velocity vab from the observed
velocities of the two members (say vsa and v
s
b ). This is
vab = v
s
a ⊖ vsb
35We notice that the wave equation is an incomplete statement of a Physical law. To be
complete, a law expressed by differential equations needs (generalised) boundary conditions
to be expressed. Then, the equivariance requires the differential equation to be used with
boundary conditions that preserve the form under the change of coordinates proposed. This
matter is completely de-emphasised in physics textbooks.
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where the superscript s runs over the equivalent observers. This is, the relat-
ive velocity, vab, is invariant under changes of observers (reference frames). It
corresponds to the foundation of the concept of group of transformations that
all those operations that leave an object invariant (be it equation, figure or any
other) form a group.
The concept of relative velocity is assumed and discussed as a part of Special
Relativity. However, the Lorentz transformations do not form a group and
the velocity addition by Einstein does not form a group either.36 Thus, the
theory collapses since there is no conceivable invariant quantity vab in it (thus
contradicting one of the implicit assumptions) but there are at most opinions
about it depending on the choice of reference frame. The problem with special
relativity is then that it does not speak about reality (as otherwise understood)
since it fails to satisfy the first postulate of logical realism: there exists a reality
independent of the observers.
Many objections to Special Relativity have appeared throughout the dec-
ades, all of them meeting the same compact rejection despite being intrinsically
different. In 1974 Thomas E Phipps published a manuscript discussing whether
the Lorentz contraction had any real existence (Phipps, 1974). The answer was
negative, after setting up a simple measurement device consisting of a rotat-
ing a disc with radial scratches. The relevant issue is that about 70 years had
been necessary to set up an experiment to refute (or not) a basic prediction of
the theory in the standard terms of Natural Science theories. On the contrary,
many article pages and textbooks had been written in the mean time discussing
the consequences of Lorentz contractions from the point of view of “thought
experiments“. 37
5 Discussion
In physics, the XIX century was signed by the quest of understanding problems
such as: What is light and how does it propagate? How does light propagation
relate to the propagation of electricity in a conductor?
As stated before, Maxwell admits in the Treatise that he cannot conceive
light propagation outside the emission theory, with a source that emits light,
a medium on which light propagates and eventually a detector. Moreover, the
emitted light should behave like a wave. Kirchhoff (Kirchhoff, 1857) had already
36A quick demonstration is as follows. The generators in the Lie algebra of the Lorentz
transformation do not close an algebra but rather have Lie-products in the algebra of rotations.
Equivalently, the Lorentz transformations correspond with the cosets in the Poincaré-Lorentz,
SO(3, 1), group where the set of rotations, SO(3), is a subgroup but not a normal subgroup.
Therefore, there is no “quotient group“ for SO(3, 1) relative to SO(3), but just a quotient
manifold. The addition in the coset manifold corresponds to Einstein’s velocity addition and
therefore it does not form a group. The structure of the Poincaré group in relation with its
subgroups and cosets is well presented in (Gilmore, 1974). We offer more mathematical details
in Appendix C.
37Thought experiments cannot challenge beliefs. At most, they can check consistency issues
between conflicting beliefs. As such, they can be used as a method for indoctrination, to let
go “false“ beliefs retaining the “proper“ ones.
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advanced a wave-like model for electricity propagation in wires. Unfortunately,
F. Neumann’s energy suggests a form for the vector potential A that cannot
host waves. Starting from the persuasion that light is an electromagnetic phe-
nomenon as suggested by the experiments of Faraday, Lorenz and others and
from the abundant experimental evidence of light as a wave phenomenon, the
quest becomes how to incorporate it to the electromagnetic phenomena evid-
enced by experiments with circuits and magnets. This is the point of divergence.
For Gauss, Lorenz and later C. Neumann and others a delay in the propagation
of electromagnetic disturbances is what is needed and, especially in Lorenz,
no other justification needs to be added. In other terms, this is inference or
abduction in its pure form. The reformulation is possible because it does not
contradict experiments and achieves a higher level of conceptual unity.
Pure reason appears not to be sufficiently convincing for others, including
Maxwell. Maxwell introduces an equivalent term in a differential equation sus-
taining his view of the (possible) existence of the ether, a matter worth to
investigate. Thus, Maxwell’s introduces the displacement current. The next
step in this quest is here represented by Hertz, who advanced in the physical
properties of the ether and adjusted Maxwell’s equations to them. If Maxwell’s
equations and the ether were weakly linked in the original, now they became a
unity. Further, Hertz opens for the possibility of separating the equations from
the ideas that originated them. The next turn by Lorentz was to conceive an
ether at rest, adapting likewise Maxwell’s equations to the situation.
Along this process, the explanatory power of Maxwell’s theory (restricted
to the four equations that are in use still today) was reduced to particular
cases, leaving out important foundational experiments. Electromagnetic sys-
tems such as Arago’s disk and Faraday’s unipolar generator where the inter-
vening parts are in relative motion were instead addressed with the introduc-
tion of the Lorentz’ force. It is interesting to consider the introduction of
Lorentz’ force in this context. In Maxwell, the electromotive force e.m.f. is
the force that moves electricity (be it fluid, particles or any other thing) and
reads e.m.f. ≡ φ = v ×B −∇ψ − ∂A
∂t
(eq. B, [619], Maxwell, 1873), where ψ
is undetermined. Lorentz’ force is then Maxwell’s electromotive force exerted
over a free-to-move charge. We get the following correspondence of symbols
E = −∂A
∂t
−∇ψ
with the additional differences that Lorentz interprets the symbol v (originally
a relational velocity) as the velocity with respect to the ether and ψ is identified
with V .
Taking the rotor in the last equation we get the “Maxwell equation“ (not
present in Maxwell’s Treatise)
∇× E = −∂B
∂t
In this way, Faraday’s induction law has been split into two parts and the
same can be said for the electromotive force. The operation reveals why the
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“new“ Faraday law (the equation above) no longer explains some experiments
by Faraday, that now require the Lorentz’ force. Thus, Lorentz goes in the
reverse direction than Maxwell: while the former seeks unity the later separates
equivalent electrical effects. To confuse things further, names and symbols are
kept but their mathematical meaning is changed.
At last, the contradictions and refutations related to the ether being dragged
or not with the movement of the earth became insurmountable. It is clear in
Lorentz that the ether is just an instrument, the relevant dynamical quantit-
ies are the fields, expressing the state of the ether. It was a small step then
to conceive the fields as properties of space, thus getting rid of the ether in
the wording of the theory, while in practice Lorentz’ formulation is used still
today, with the additions of Einstein’s special relativity. Before Einstein the
electromagnetic theory of light was untenable in view of its internal conflicts.
After Einstein the problem shifted to a more subtle one, since it is based on
concepts that the theory cannot sustain (such as relative velocity and the group
property of coordinate transformations) and on assumptions (the constancy of
the velocity of light) that were not put to experimental test for many decades.
As previously discussed in Section 2, only reason is the supporting pillar of
scientific theories, in particular the absence of internal contradictions and the
ability to honestly resist refutation attempts. On the contrary, a characteristic
of the construction of EM has been that failures, drawbacks, contradictions and
refutations had little effect. Since there appeared to be no alternative to the
emission/propagation theory of light (once the alternative lines of thought were
suppressed or ignored), no mishap whatsoever could weaken this substantialist
belief. However, alternatives did exist, only that they were never sufficiently
studied, and still aren’t.
Thus, the historic construction of current electromagnetism reveals a much
larger and decisive underlying process: it represents a breaking point that
changes the goals of science from seeking the harmony of the cosmos to the
much limited search for some sort of usefulness or success. The scientific goal
becomes vague or poorly defined and it substantially broadens the meaning of
science. When Einstein states “The justification (truth content) of the system
rests in the proof of usefulness of the resulting theorems on the basis of sense
experiences“, we do not know the service or purpose that has been stated for
science: what does useful mean in this context? The meaning will soon be
provided by the society at large, true will then become “useful for production“,
and Scientia will be spelled techné.
When science is being redefined, the scientist producing successful predic-
tions will later be appreciated as a “seer“ (Oxford dictionary: “A person of
supposed supernatural insight who sees visions of the future.“). Thus, predic-
tion (“vision“) is what is to be commended and not the consistency implicit in
harmony. It is no longer a surprise that authors as L. Smolin and J. Harnad
contrast “seers“ and “craftsmen“ (in their assessment of string theory (Ch. 18;
Smolin and Harnad, 2008)) as the theoretical physicist subtypes. For Smolin
and Harnad, Einstein is the prototype of the seer.
The new wisdom may have ancestral roots, since sorcerers were the guardians
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of accumulated knowledge in most primitive cultures and technology is a fun-
damental element in defining a culture. We observe that the new scientist, the
theoretical physicist, occupied an empty niche in the society emerging from the
second industrial revolution and the decline of the Enlightenment culture. The
new scientists become the priests that interpret the oracle of “science“ relevant
for technology.
Departing from the philosophical and mathematical realm that was the place
of physics until the middle of the XIX century, the new epistemic view puts
intuition above reason when they come in conflict. But since “We have no power
of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions“
(pp. 230; Peirce, 1955), intuition sets us back to the constructs of the child
and in particular, the notion of space, time and of reality (Piaget, 1999)38. The
construction of the child is elevated to a dogma: to understand is to put the
observed in terms of the real (as constructed by the child). The transition goes
from a philosophical ideation to simple ideation (Husserl, 1983). The inferred
or abducted is rejected when it does not conform the intuitive form: Not only
instantaneous action at distance is rejected, but delayed action at distance is
rejected as well. It is not the case that Hertz cannot understand Maxwell, it is
a conscious decision of enforcing his own view of what it means to understand
but taking benefit of the previously produced equations. This means to give
no consideration to the inferences of Faraday and Maxwell (and of a large list
of mathematicians); they are rejected in limine. A free game of interpretations
is then entertained, the equations become runes that have to be deciphered,
interpreted. In a last move Einstein observed that a symmetry that must be
present is not present in the inherited wisdom. The symmetry (see Appendix
B) certainly was present in Faraday’s perceptions and experiments as well as
in Maxwell’s original equations, what was needed was (is) to restore what had
been destroyed by free interpretation. Instead, we get a new interpretation,
being Einstein immersed in the new culture of theoretical physics.
The new approach adopted by theoretical physics has reproductive advant-
ages as well since it builds on top of students’ intuitions. Physics textbooks do
not discuss notions of space or time, they just construct physics supported on
the children’s intuitions for such concepts and build new “intuitions“ in the form
of habits by repetitive exercising. In contrast, the critical approach requires the
development of confidence in the own forces of the student, it rests upon the
bildung (Sorkin, 1983) including its tense relation with teaching as it emerges
from W. von Humboldt words: “Whatever man is inclined to, without the free
exercise of his own choice, or whatever only implies instruction and guidance,
does not enter into his very being, but still remains alien to his true nature, and
is, indeed, effected by him, not so much with human agency, as with the mere
exactness of mechanical routine“(von Humboldt, 1792 (1854 Edited).
38Apparently Science and scientists are unaware of this epistemic operation, that occurs
completely behind the scenes, guided by habit and training.
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6 Conclusions
For the construction of mechanics we have an ample experience of the no-
tions of body, space, time and motion, that were produced in our infancy
(Solari and Natiello, 2018). Thanks to this early organisation of our percep-
tions, mechanics can be built with two pillars: simple intuition (experience)
and reason. In contrast, our direct relation with electromagnetism is not part
of our early intuitive construction. Experience is scarce, it is provided by ex-
periments limited in several forms and is subject to a conscious interpretation
in terms of our pre-existent beliefs. Ultimately, experiments challenged beliefs
such as: the principle of action and reaction, the material existence of the ether
and what is matter and how matter acts onto (relates with) matter.
Ideally, electromagnetism can be constructed with these two pillars, acting
both as requisites on equal footing, and that was Maxwell’s original attempt. In
replacement of an insufficient experience he (and others) introduced analogies,
although he (following Faraday’s teachings and Newton’s tradition) was very
reluctant to formulate physical hypothesis and kept them to a minimum. In
contrast, the Göttingen school appears as not needing intuition, or at least, as
keeping always intuition under rational supervision (“philosophical intuition” in
the terminology of Husserl), intuition was not on an equal footing than reason
but just an aid.
While Maxwell’s epistemology is rooted in British empiricism, in continental
Europe the dictum of Hegel “What is rational is real and what is real is rational”
appears to have influenced the scientific minds. Thus, reality is the rational or-
ganisation of the electromagnetic phenomena that gives unity to the observed
but exists only in relation with the particular (observed) realisations. Much
later, Jean-Paul Sartre would beautifully write: “an electrical current does not
have a secret reverse side; it is nothing but the totality of the physical-chemical
actions which manifest it (electrolysis, the incandescence of a carbon filament,
the displacement of the needle of a galvanometer, etc.). No one of this actions
alone is sufficient to reveal it. But no action indicates anything that is behind
itself; it indicates itself and the principle of the series.”(Introduction, Sartre,
1966). Both lines of thought, the continental and the insular, had a broad co-
incidence when it comes to the final mathematical expressions, their divergence
lying in the foundations sustaining the actual development.
The epistemological grounds of Maxwell’s approach were laid in 1856 (Maxwell,
1856). In replacement of an insufficient experience he (and others) introduced
analogies, although Maxwell (following Faraday’s teaching and Newton’s tra-
dition) was cautious and regarded his analogies as tentative. Maxwell in his
treatise as well as in his 1865 paper, follows a construction method that paral-
lels the method of Lagrangian mechanics. It can be said then that Lagrangian
formulations transcend (or surpass in Piaget-García’s language) mechanics be-
coming a method for the construction of mathematical physics. The beliefs
obtained by this method are accepted only because they organise the experi-
ence in electromagnetism, i.e., the theory is abduced. As Lorenz insightfully
indicates, the ether in Maxwell, and to a lesser degree in Faraday, “had only
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been useful to furnish a basis for our imagination”.
However, in one point Maxwell’s insight came short of Faraday’s, namely in
conceiving light as anything else than a wave emitted an propagated through
some propagation medium. He even attempted to “correct” Faraday when the
latter advanced an alternative view39. We recognise that Maxwell was in front of
a deep difficulty: how to understand a reasoning that requires to change what we
consider understanding? If understanding that one is (or may be) wrong about
something is not difficult, understanding that what we call “to understand” may
not be correct appears almost impossible.
Maxwell complained referring to the Göttingen school: “There appears to
be, in the minds of these eminent men, some prejudice or à-priori objection,
against the hypothesis of a medium in which the phenomena of radiation of
light and heat and the electric actions at a distance take place. [...] Hence the
undulatory theory of light has met with much opposition, directed not against
its failure to explain the phenomena, but against its assumption of the existence
of a medium in which light is propagated.”([865], Maxwell, 1873). It should be
noted that the “undulatory theory of light” did not meet any opposition from the
Göttingen school. They also provided a wave equation and attempted different
motivations for it, based in Gauss’ suggestion of delayed action at a distance.
The opposition focused in the hypothesis of a propagating medium and in the
peculiar and contradictory properties that were required for this medium.
In fact, in the same article [865] Maxwell acknowledges that the Göttingen
school had good reasons to be sceptical about the ether: “...It is true that at one
time those who speculated as to the causes of physical phenomena were in the
habit of accounting for each kind of action at a distance by means of a special
æthereal fluid, whose function and property it was to produce these actions.
They filled all space three and four times over with æthers of different kinds,
the properties of which were invented merely to ’ save appearances,’ so that
more rational enquirers were willing rather to accept not only Newton’s definite
law of attraction at a distance, but even the dogma of Cotes, that action at a
distance is one of the primary properties of matter, and that no explanation can
be more intelligible than this fact...” Nevertheless, if Maxwell’s form of knowing
(his epistemology) was correct, the ether must be real, and hence it becomes
necessary to know more about it, he indeed closes the Treatise (last paragraph)
stating that “all these theories lead to the conception of a medium in which the
propagation takes place, and if we admit this medium as an hypothesis, I think
it ought to occupy a prominent place in our investigations, and that we ought
to endeavour to construct a mental representation of all the details of its action,
and this has been my constant aim in this treatise.”
Some years later a new epistemology spread through continental Europe
emanating from Berlin and in coincidence with the German unification and the
construction of the first Reich: the bild conception (D’Agostino, 2004). This
new epistemology required for understanding the construction of mental images
39It is remarkable that Faraday’s vibrating ray theory is compatible with (and probably was
influential to) the developments of the Göttingen School at those times.
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of the real. Whether this real was accessible to the senses or not, it did not
matter. Hence, under the new epistemology, the ether became real without
carrying the research proposed by Maxwell.
Hertz’ bild conception appears as a militant epistemology for it suppressed
large portions of Maxwell’s treatise arguing that it reflected a mechanistic ap-
proach incompatible with the ether. Nevertheless, he conveniently kept Max-
well’s equations but without offering an alternative, “non mechanistic”, deriva-
tion. In the same movement it achieved three goals: first, to ignore Faraday-
Maxwell’s epistemology; second, to suppress any mention of the old German
electromagnetism in its evolved form, probably feeling justified by the argument
that the equations were “the same” than those in Maxwell; and third, to suppress
the Lagrangian basis of the organisation of electromagnetism. The meaning of
science was changed by detaching the symbolic relations produced, disregarding
the construction and allowing for a free interpretation of the equations. This
movement began the transition from modern science to techno-science, free-
ing the later of the rigidities imposed by reason. Such an idea goes completely
against Hegel’s conceptions as well, for Hegel “Everything, other than the reality
which is established by the conception, is transient, surface existence, external
attribute, opinion, appearance void of essence, untruth, delusion, and so forth.
Through the actual shape [Gestaltung], which it takes upon itself in actuality,
is the conception itself understood. This shape is the other essential element of
the idea, and is to be distinguished from the form [Form], which exists only as
conception [Begriff].”(Hegel, 2001) 40
Schematically, Maxwell requirements to accept a belief as a (temporary)
truth were: to mathematically organise the subject (rationality) and to be com-
patible with a substantialist (intuitive) view. The Göttingen school put ration-
ality over intuition, while the Berlin school put intuition over rationality. Hertz
must be recognised as the one who understood that, unlike the experience with
mechanics, in electromagnetism intuition and reason had come to some degree
of incompatibility. Maxwell’s goal was impossible to achieve.
Later experiments in the search of the ether showed that none of the concep-
tions of the ether was compatible with experiences. The well known Michelson-
Morley experiment shows that if light is considered as moving through space the
way bodies move (i.e., if it can be regarded in analogy with material bodies or
perturbations of matter) then space-time cannot be conceived in Galilean terms.
When substantialism fails to reach conscious state41 and in so doing avoids the
inspection of reason, the antecedent is never questioned. This amounts to put-
ting intuition above reason when they come in conflict. Hence, the accepted
conclusion of the experiment became that the world was not as Galileo and
Leibniz conceived it. Thus, substantialism is not an interpretation of physics,
it pre-exist physics and forges it. It is difficult to put substantialism under ex-
amination because we tend to believe (or we are indoctrinated to believe) that
40Notice that the paragraph is more meaningful if we translate Gestaltung as: shaping,
forming, manifesting, ...
41We may indeed speak of “hidden substantialism”, as in Maxwell (and almost all of his
followers) that could not conceive light propagation otherwise.
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we (the scientists) understand a world whose rules pre-exist our understanding
effort. The constructivist thinks/knows otherwise and he/she is willing to of-
fer his form of understanding for philosophical/rational examination, this is, to
criticism.
The historical construction of electromagnetism cannot be separated from
its place in history. The goals behind the attack against the school of Göttingen
carried out by Clausius do not appear to be only academic. During the second
part of the XIX century, Germany, which was very active in science, was emer-
ging to industrialisation on the economic side and was reunified on the political
side. The growth of the universities (in terms of number of students) and a new
emphasis in research resulted in the installation of a second professor in physics,
this is, there was an important expansion in the number of physicists working in
the academia. The “second physicist” is the origin of the “theoretical physicist”
as we learn from (Jungnickel and McCormmach, 2017). The first “theoretical
physicist” they recognise as such is Rudolph Clausius. In this social and polit-
ical context, the expansion of the academic positions should have resulted in
the dissemination of the theories and epistemology dominating in Berlin. 42
Prisoner of his own doctrine43 and of his time, Einstein tried to restore some
rationality to the electromagnetism of his time, but he resorted to the same epi-
stemological approach that had left it devoid from reason: a new interpretation
of the equations separated from their conception. The principle of relativity
presented by Poincaré and used by Einstein impress us as true because it builds
upon the habits acquired in mechanics and it has a reminiscence of the principle
of no-arbitrariness. The absence of a process to attain its conception undermines
its truth; actually, in a Hegelian view it is untrue. The principle is based on
the hidden proposition: every real, objective, interaction can be presented in
subjective form. However, this proposition is not necessarily true and perpetu-
ates Newton’s concept of force. After assuming that electromagnetism could be
presented in subjective form, the new proposal failed to incorporate Lorentz’
space-time as a real concept and not just as mere opinion. For a concept to
be real, it must be intersubjective, which in terms of mathematics demands
the existence of a group structure. The substantialist view of light and elec-
tromagnetic interactions clashes with the inherited structure of the space-time.
Since –as for Maxwell before– an alternative to this substantialist view could
not be conceived (or it passed unnoticed), the remaining option was an attempt
to change space-time. It is worth to emphasise that for the relational point of
view, the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1881 only gives the expected results,
and actually, one would have considered a waste of time to perform it 44.
42For example, Albert Einstein was born in the German Empire, Kingdom of Württemberg,
and his first advisor in Zürich was Heinrich Friedrich Weber (not to be confused with Wilhelm
Eduard Weber) who was for some time the first assistant of Helmholtz at Berlin.
43A quote of Chuang Tse in Ortega y Gasset’s “Mission of the university” reads: “How will
I be able to speak about the sea with the frog when she has never gone out of her pond? How
will I be able to speak about the ice with the summer bird when he is anchored in his season?
How will I be able to speak with the savant about Life when he is prisoner of his doctrine?”
(Ortega y Gasset, 2004-2010) (translated by the authors).
44On the contrary, Michelson’s experiment from 1925 in the relational view reveals the
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The construction of Special Relativity begins by assuming the existence of
a relational velocity (real, unique, not just an opinion) that at the end will
find no place in the theory. This happens on the mathematical side because
of the lack of an appropriate group structure and on the construction side be-
cause intuitions such as relative velocity belong to a different conception of
space-time. The solution to this nightmare was a new epistemological reform,
where theories arise from “free thinking” and are only vaguely related to the
observed/measured reality. This is, by insisting in that concepts have a life
and a reality by themselves and not in relation to the conceptualisation, science
becomes mere appearance and lacks reality (always thinking in Hegel’s key). It
is only opinion, for every reference system in special relativity is entitled to its
opinion, but there is no common point or consistent equivalence between the
opinions, hence, there is no reality.
The absence of the real, however, is no longer a problem when the measure of
truth is usefulness (Einstein, 1940). This completes the epistemological voyage
towards vulgar pragmatism, transforming science from understanding nature
(an in so doing adapting to it and empathising with it) into being a platform
for technology, sharing its goals, equating truth with success and allowing for
technology (science) to dominate nature, then playing the role wanted by the
society at large: the industrial society.
The accepted version of electromagnetic theory (as discussed e.g., in text-
books) is the outcome of both electromagnetism as a scientific problem and of
a series of epistemic decisions that impulsed the reformulation of science in the
second half of the XIX century. The Enlightenment era with Rousseau’s social
contract and Kant’s critical reason was declining and giving way to a new era
signed by industrial development and a return to imperial thinking (and acting).
Electromagnetism develops symbiotically with the new form of “savant” ad-
apted to the epoch, the theoretical physicist. Indeed, theoretical physicists will
adopt electromagnetism as a model of scientific construction. The equations
constitute “the theory” and as such will be placed above any criticism, as oc-
curred with Maxwell’s equations and is the case also for Relativity. Underneath
the equation level a broad interpretation game develops. Critical thinking, in-
cluding its role of challenging the foundations of theories upon mismatches with
experiment, is suppressed. Where the theory could be in fault it is patched
with new ad hoc substantialist forms. In this way elements such as neutrinos,
dark matter or dark energy emerge. Their universal form is prescribed by the
epistemology and only the particular form depends on empirical data.
S. Traweek expresses the “common sense” of normal (in the sense of Kuhn
(Kuhn, 1962)) physicists in the terms “it must be true because it works”, reflect-
ing the decisive motto of vulgar pragmatism. She perceives that “high energy
physicists construct their world and represent it to themselves as free of their
own agency, a description, as thick as I could make it, of an extreme culture of
objectivity: a culture of no culture” (Epilogue, Traweek, 1992). As we have seen,
much of the physicist’s conception of the world comes from themselves, not from
relative velocity between source and detector.
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their knowledge, but rather from the ignorance about their own limitations.
This state of things was mediated by changes in the society at large. The
foundations of physical science have ceased to be available to the general reas-
oning and can only be handled by specialists. Like medieval guilds, specialists
become the guardians of a way of doing things within a community. Such elitist
practice avoids exposing the basic dogma of substantialism and lesser practices
such as “mathematical fetishism” (the adoration of mathematical formulae) to
the inspection by the philosopher. Philosophy of science more often than not
adopts the form of “praise of the scientist”, considering only issues that science
has left open, but laymen are not admitted in the discussion of space, time, or
the universe, no matter how philosophically solid they could be.45 It is often
said that the theoretical physicist has rescued cosmology from religion but in so
doing he/she has become dogmatic.
Enlightenment was signed by the supremacy of reason and the social con-
tract. The present postmodernism (understood as reason’s loss of supremacy
and the abandonment of critical reason), that emerged in science before pervad-
ing culture in general, it has now to be walked through and negated (in Hegel’s
meaning). Our time is the epoch of global warming, the fires consuming the
Amazonas, the mass extinction of species, etc., the milestones of an era we can-
not escape and that is in need of a second Enlightenment, a reconstruction of
reason. For this, a new social and environmental contract is required, regaining
the plenitude of reason and its right to express itself in all issues, recovering its
critical strengths, the search for foundations and the unity of reason. We beg
the reader to allow us to believe that the elaboration of this manuscript, being
possible now and not in earlier times, is a sign that the transit to a new epoch
has already begun.
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Appendices
A Delayed action at a distance
The origins of delayed action at a distance have been reproduced in several
works along the years. The initial impetus was apparently given by Gauss
around 1845, as mentioned in his letter to Weber (bd.5 p. 627-629, Gauss,
1870). The idea of delays connect with Faraday’s “ray vibrations” (Faraday,
1855, p. 447), from 1846 as well. The first explicit mathematical formula-
tion was given by Riemann (Riemann, 1867)(presented in 1858 and published
in 1867) and L. Lorenz (Lorenz, 1867) in adjacent articles in the same issue
of Annalen der Physik. The idea was discussed in detail by Carl Neumann
(Neumann, 1868) soon after. Eventually, the idea of retarded effects entered
the textbooks. In more recent times, the issue has been reconsidered in various
contexts by Moon&Spencer (Moon et al, 1989b,a, 1994), and Bilbao (Bilbao,
2016; Bilbao et al, 2014) among others.
For the sake of the issue about the propagation of electromagnetic effects,
the common grounds are the use of electric and magnetic potentials. Basic-
ally, eq.(5) for the magnetic vector potential with no delays is re-proposed as
A(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
U
(
j(y, t)
|x− y|
)
d3y. Technically, the potentials are obtained by a
convolution, i.e., the integral of the material support of the potential (a current
source j occupying the region U) with the kernel
W(x− y, t− s) = µ0
4π
δ(t− s)
|x− y|
in the following way:
A(x, t) =
ˆ
ds
ˆ
U
d3yW(x− y, t− s)j(y, s)
where δ is the delta distribution.
Under the prerequisites of the No Arbitrariness Principle (Solari and Natiello,
2018) the introduction of the delays reconsiders the form of the vector potential
for a current source j occupying the region U acting on a particle at position
x, time t in a situation of relative rest between source and target. The delayed
potential is
A(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
U
(
j(y, t− 1
C
|x− y|)
|x− y|
)
d3y (11)
A similar expression for the electric potential, generalising Poisson’s law reads
V (x, t) =
1
4πǫ0
ˆ
U
ρ(y, t− 1
C
|x− y|)
|x− y| d
3y =
µ0C
2
4π
ˆ
U
ρ(y, t− 1
C
|x− y|)
|x− y| d
3y
(12)
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Note that A and
V
C2
satisfy the same constitutive equation in relation to j and
ρ and that these two quantities are assumed to be a property of matter, i.e.,
they are identically zero outside the region U where matter exists (in the sequel
we skip indicating U to lighten the notation). In convolution terms the delayed
kernel
W
d(x− y, t− s) = µ0
4π
δ(t− s− 1
C
|x− y|)
|x− y|
is now used.
This formulation follows the ideas of C. Neumann and Lorenz as expressed
in eq.(3). All involved quantities are relational, independent of the coordin-
ate system and therefore universal. Different subjective representations of the
resulting interaction are equivalent, being the Galilean transformations the un-
derlying group.
Without delays, the vector potential from eq.(5) satisfies Poisson’s equa-
tion ∆A = −µ0j. Maxwell’s path to the wave equation was to incorporate the
required time-derivatives in his instantaneous action theory through the intro-
duction of the displacement current jD, to be added to the galvanic current
j. Basically, −µ0jD = 1
C2
∂2A
∂t2
. This “current” was to be present even in the
absence of matter and Maxwell related it to the ether.
The delayed potentials, on the other hand, satisfy a wave-equation automat-
ically. Indeed,starting from eq.(11) or, correspondingly from eq.(12), we have
(we do not write the arguments of ji when it helps to simplify the notation, we
also write r for |x− y|):
∇xAi = µ0
4π
ˆ
d3y
(
− ∂
∂t
ji∇x rC
r
+ ji∇x 1
r
)
∆Ai = ∇x · ∇xAi
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3y
(
ji∆
1
r
− 2∇x 1
r
· ji,t∇x r
C
−
∂
∂t
ji∆
r
C
r
+
∂2
∂t2
ji
r
|∇x r
C
|2
)
Moreover, standard operations of vector calculus give
ji,t
(
2∇1
r
· ∇ r
C
+
∆ r
C
r
)
= 0
|∇ r
C
|2 = 1
C2
and therefore
∆Ai(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3y ji(y, t− r
C
)∆
(
1
r
)
+
(
1
C2
)
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3y
∂2
∂t2
ji(y, t− rC )
r
The time derivative in the last term can be extracted outside the integral, thus
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yielding,
✷Ai(x, t)
def
= ∆Ai(x, t)−
(
1
C2
)
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3y
∂2
∂t2
ji(y, t− rC )
r
= ∆Ai(x, t)−
(
1
C2
)
∂2
∂t2
Ai(x, t)
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3y ji(y, t− |x− y|
C
)∆
(
1
r
)
= −µ0ji(x, t)
Maxwell’s and Lorenz’ alternatives are the only two options starting from static
potentials satisfying Poisson equation. In order to arrive to an inhomogeneous
wave equation, either one adds a “correction” to an instantaneous current j(y, t)
(or charge ρ(y, t)) or one builds up the sources following the general solutions of
the wave equation. In other words, the option is ether (or dependence of charge
and current with the frame of reference) or delays.
A.1 Relative motion
The assumption of delayed action opens up new possibilities that were precluded
by instantaneous action. The question arises whether two systems in relative
motion will have the same sort of interaction as systems at relative rest whenever
their relative distance at the time t in consideration is the same in both cases.
For the sake of clarity consider two identical sources, in relative motion that
for a given time t “coincide” (ideally) in space, along with a detector that is at
rest relative to one of the sources. Instantaneous action at time t as given by
eq.(5) cannot distinguish between the sources, having both the same current (or
charge) and being at the same distance relative to the detector at that given
time. However, delayed action conveys a clear distinction since the current (or
charge) of the source at an earlier time enters the description, and at that earlier
time it was possible to distinguish the sources: their distances to the detector
were not the same.
Recasted under the hypothesis of delayed action, the phenomenon of induc-
tion originating in the relative motion of source and detector reveals itself as a
natural consequence. The delay hypothesis provides the wave equation and it
also reorganises previous knowledge in a more integrated manner.
Let (Φ, ζ) represent any of the pairs (Ai, ji) or (
V
C2
, ρ) connected to each
other by the same convolution kernel. Consider further that source and detector
move relative to each other with constant relative velocity v. If x represents
a local coordinate of the detector, we are now interested in computing the
potentials A and V at a point x′ = x + vt relative to the source. Without
the delay hypothesis a natural choice is:
Φv(x, t) = Φ(x + vt, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
ζ(y, t)
|x+ vt− y| d
3y (13)
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where Φv expresses the value of the potential at the point x of the detector.
This corresponds to the convolution kernel
Wv(x− y, t− s) = µ0
4π
δ(t− s)
|x+ vt− y| .
For zero relative velocity, eq.(5) is recovered. In this expression motion is of no
consequence other than that of altering the relative distances.
We cannot expect the above equation to hold for low velocities, since already
the delay is missing in it. When taking into account the delay hypothesis,
whatever proposed generalisation of W must have the correct limit for low
velocities, but also satisfy the known experimental behaviour of electromagnetic
phenomena, namely the Doppler effect (Dingle, 1960a; Mandelberg and Witten,
1962; Kaivola et al, 1985). This effect expresses the observed fact that the
frequencies associated to electromagnetic phenomena perceived by a detector in
motion relative to a source are different from the frequencies of the source in a
precisely determined way. However, Wv does not comply with Doppler.
An option that has not been previously investigated is
W
d
v(x− y, t− s) =
µ0
4π
δ(t− s− 1
g(v)C
|x− y + vg(v)(t− s)|)
|x− y + vg(v)(t− s)|
where g(v) is a monotonically increasing function of relative velocity such that
g(0) = 1. This function has to be chosen in such a way that the delayed kernel
W
d
v
gives the correct expression for the Doppler effect. Further,
Φv(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
ds
ˆ
d3y ζ(y, s)
δ(t − s− 1
g(v)C
|x− y + vg(v)(t− s)|)
|x− y + vg(v)(t− s)|
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
ds
ˆ
d3z ζ(z + g(v)v(t − s), s)
δ(t− s− 1
g(v)C
|x− z|)
|x− z|
Φv(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3z
ζ(z +
v
C
|x− z|, t− 1
g(v)C
|x− z|)
|x− z|
The second line arises from the variable substitution z = y − vg(v)(t − s)
and the last line from time-integration.
Relative motion influences also the perception of charge and current. For
low velocities the equation of continuity requires that jv = j−ρv. In the general
case, from the second line above, with ρ in place of ζ and for constant velocity,
we obtain
∂ρ
∂t
= ∇ρ · g(v)v = ∇ · (g(v)ρv)
whence jv = j − g(v)ρv.
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Turning to the Doppler effect, we attempt to compute the Fourier transform
of the kernel. For a situation of relative rest between source and detector, we
have
F (Wd) (k, w) = µ0
4π
ˆ
dτ
ˆ
d3z exp(−ikz − iwτ)δ(τ −
1
C
|z|)
|z|
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3z
exp(−ikz − iw
C
|z|)
|z| =
µ0
|k|2 −
(w
C
)2 (14)
where the substitutions z = x − y and τ = t− s were used. Alternative to the
present computation by integration in the distributional sense, we may consider
the Fourier transform of Φ(x, t) recovering the same result:
F (Φ) = F (Wd)F (ζ) = F (Wd)(− 1
µ0
)
F (✷Φ)
= F (Wd)(− 1
µ0
)(
−|k|2 +
(w
C
)2)
F (Φ)
Repeating the process and substitutions for the case of relative motion, we
obtain a similar integral:
F (Wd
v
)
(k, w) =
ˆ
dτ
ˆ
d3z exp(−ikz − iwτ)
δ(τ − 1
g(v)C |z + g(v)vτ |)
|z + g(v)vτ |
Letting u = z + g(v)vτ and σ = g(v)τ , it follows that
F (Wdv) (k, w) =
ˆ
dσ
g(v)
ˆ
d3u exp(−iku− i w
g(v)
σ) exp(ik · vσ)δ(σ −
1
C
|u|)
|u|
=
1
g(v)
ˆ
d3u
exp(−iku− i w
g(v)C
|u|) exp(ik · v
C
|u|)
|u|
=
1
g(v)
µ0
|k|2 −
(
w
g(v)C
− k · v
C
)2
The observed Doppler effect is recovered letting
g(v) =
1√
1−
( v
C
)2
since for k ·v = |k| |v| the frequency shifts to w = g(v) (vk ± kC) = g(v)k(v±C)
and for k · v = 0 it gives w = ±g(v)|kC|.
Doppler experiments are accurate up to O( v
C
)2, so experimental observations
are compatible with any delay factor such that g(v) = 1 + 12 (
v
C
)2 +O( v
C
)3.
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A.1.1 An alternative view
Let us consider the change of variables u = g(v)v, for g(v)−1 =
√
1−
( v
C
)2
.
Then we may recast Wd
v
and the previous developments in terms of u, using
that
v =
u√
1 +
( u
C
)2 and g(v) =
√
1 +
( u
C
)2
.
Letting then γ =
√
1 +
( u
C
)2
, we find that
W
d
u(x− y, t− s) =
µ0
4π
δ(t− s− 1
γC
|x− y + u(t− s)|)
|x− y + u(t− s)|
Φu(x, t) =
µ0
4π
ˆ
ds
ˆ
d3y ζ(y, s)
δ(t− s− 1
γC
|x− y + u(t− s)|)
|x− y + u(t− s)|
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
d3z
ζ(z +
u
C
|x− y|, t− 1
γC
|x− z|)
|x− z|
This suggests a different connection between mechanics and electrodynamics.
We may regard u as the mechanical velocity (the one that is determined with
rods and chronometers) and v as a sort of “electromagnetic velocity”, bounded
by C46. This electromagnetic velocity usually is computed in indirect form, by
energy measurements in order to determine γ = g(v) and thereafter obtain v.
For v ≪ C, the difference between u and v is negligible while for comparatively
large velocities u cannot be measured independently.
Under this assumptions,Wd
v
differs fromWv only in one γ factor. The “role”
of the factor is to adjust the delay time. Electromagnetic interactions evolve
“more slowly” when source and detector are in relative motion as compared
with the corresponding interactions at relative rest. It is not space-time that
undergoes deformations but only the properties of electromagnetic interactions.
A.2 Relationism and the speed of light
The idea that a relational view is necessarily associated to a “speed of light”
of the form (C ± v) = | w|k| | has been so deeply inculcated that it needs to
be addressed. The question we want to raise is: Are there relational kernels
that have as low velocity limit Maxwell’s electromagnetism and also provide the
correct Doppler shift with C = | w|k| |? The answer is affirmative. We provide
here an example. We first introduce the vector decomposition:
46This connects nicely with the fact that u is an unbounded quantity that can be associated
to an additive group (the usual Galilean group connected to mechanical velocities), with a
nonlinear counterpart for v, compatible with v < C(Solari and Natiello, 2018, Theorem 2).
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a = a‖ + a⊥
a‖ = (a · vˆ) vˆ
a⊥ = a− a‖ = vˆ × (a× vˆ)
Next, consider the convolution kernel
K(τ,X) =
µ0
4π
δ(τ ′ − 1
C
|X ′|) 1|X ′|
τ ′ = γ(τ +
v
C2
X‖)
X ′ = γ(X‖ + vτ) +X⊥
where γ = 1√
1−
( v
C
)2 and v is the relative velocity between source and detector.
Further, let the propagation of an electromagnetic current or charge density be
of the same form as above, namely
Ψv(x, t) =
ˆ
ds
ˆ
d3yK(t− s, x− y)ζ(y, s)
K is a relational kernel that does not depend on the choice of origin of time
or the reference for the space and coincides with Wd for v = 0. The Fourier
transform, F ,of the potential Ψv is now
F(Ψv) = F(K)F(ζ)
where
F(K) = µ0
4π
ˆ
d3X
ˆ
dτ exp(−i(k ·X + wt))δ(τ ′ − 1
C
|X ′|) 1|X ′|
Letting Lv be the Lorentz’ transformation, we have
(k ·X + wt) = (k, w)†(L−vLv)(X, τ)
= (L−v(k, w))
†
(Lv(X, τ))
= (L−v(k, w))
†
(X ′, τ ′)
after a change of variables in the integral we obtain the expression already
considered in eq.(14), the result being
F(Ψv) = F(ρ)

 µ0
|k′|2 −
(
w′
C
)2


k′ = k⊥ + γ(k‖ −
v
C2
w)
w′ = γ(w − k‖v)
80
It can now be verified that if F(ρ) = δ(w − w0) the observed frequency w′
presents the correct Doppler shift and that |w
′|
|k′| = C =
|w|
|k| is the relation for
the emerging light.
B Electromagnetic Force and Lorentz’ Lagrangian
Maxwell introduced Lagrangian methods in electrodynamics transcending (or
surpassing) their mechanical origin. We compute here the electromagnetic force
Fem exerted on a probe system by electric and magnetic fields E,B following
Maxwell’s method. We advance that specialising Lorentz’ hypothesis about
current, the Lorentz force is recovered.
From the electric and magnetic potentials the corresponding fields can be
obtained via B = ∇×A and E = −∇V − ∂A
∂t
. Maxwell’s equations read
∇ ·B = 0
∇ ·E = ρ
ǫ0
∇×B = µ0
(
j +
∂E
∂t
)
∇× E = −∂B
∂t
Where the fields (and the equations) are given from a reference system at rest
with the source. Maxwell’s total current reads J = j +
∂E
∂t
. The Lagrangian
introduced by Lorentz (Chapter I and IV; Lorentz, 1892) reads
L = 1
2
ˆ
dt
ˆ (
1
µ0
|B|2 − ǫ0|E|2
)
d3x
and the variation to be considered is that of the probe, namely δE = δE2,
δB = δB2. The subscript 2 stands for “secondary” electrical body.
Before proceeding further, we need to introduce the action, following an in-
sight that can be found in C. Neumann (Neumann, 1868), thus departing from
Lorentz’s approach that is based on a non-rigorous “physical argumentation”
supported upon his idea of a material ether. Let the electromagnetic contribu-
tion to the mechanical action be
A =
ˆ
dtL
and accept, following Hamilton’s principle, that δE and δB are zero in the
extremes of the interval of time-integration. This mechanical action may be
recast in different ways by performing partial integrations along with Gauss’
relation ˆ
U
d3x(∇ · F ) =
ˆ
∂U
dσ · F
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and expressions derived from it for some electromagnetic field F . Further, we
accept Maxwell’s hypothesis that the fields decay at infinity in a such a form
that the surface integral can be neglected. Maxwell’s equations were obtained
under these conditions, which means that they cannot be used if this restriction
is lifted. 47 After introducing the vector potential, A, and the scalar potential,
V with the relations
E = −(∂A
∂t
+∇V )
B = ∇×A
and “integrating by parts” (e.g. [631] p. 270, Maxwell, 1873) in space and time,
the following correspondence is found
δA =
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3x [A · δj − V δρ] (15)
In what follows, we will consider only the low velocity case, setting g(v) = 1,
which is the case considered by Maxwell and Lorentz. We need to introduce
more details in the calculation. Let x¯(t) be the relative position between the
primary and secondary electrical bodies (the primary being everything else in
consideration except the probe). We define currents and potentials through
ρ¯2(x, t) = ρ2(x− x¯(t), t)
j¯2 = j2(x− x¯(t), t) + ˙¯xρ2(x− x¯(t), t)
✷A2 =
µ0
4π
j¯2
✷V2 =
1
4πǫ0
ρ¯2
The potentials can be found using eq.(13), but this latter property will not used
in the present discussion.
In such conditions, the variation of the current and of the charge distribution
due to the motion of the probe are:
δj¯2 = −(δx¯ · ∇)j¯2 + ρ¯2 ˙¯x
δρ¯2 = −(δx¯ · ∇)ρ¯2
We have then
δA = δ
ˆ
dtL =
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3x [A · δj¯2 − V δρ¯2]
=
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3x
[
j¯2 · (δx¯ · ∇)A− ρ¯2 (δx¯ · ∇)V − δx¯ · (Aρ¯2),t
]
(16)
47Notice that this implies that electromagnetism cannot be used to describe an infinite
universe. Only a finite universe is compatible with our tools, an infinite universe is beyond
our capabilities of explanation. The finite universe of cosmology is an hypothesis required by
our limitations and not a conclusion reached from our knowledge.
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(the second line after integration by parts and the use of the wave equations
for the vector potential). Further transformation with mathematical identities
allows us to write
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3x δx · [j¯2 ×B + ρ¯2E] .
This is, following the standard use of Hamilton’s principle in mechanics we arrive
to an electromagnetic contribution to the force on the probe
Fem = j¯2 ×B + ρ¯2E
Lorentz considered only the case j2 = 0, hence j¯2 = ρ¯2 ˙¯x. We have then
derived from Hamilton’s principle and the Lagrangian base in Lorentz (which is
actually based upon C. Neumann’s Lagrangian and action) the Lorentz’ force,
after assuming Lorentz’ current. We must emphasise however that the velocity
in our deduction is relational and in Lorentz’ work is relative to the ether. The
second difference is that our presentation is fully mathematical while Lorentz’
one contains hand-waving arguments. The third difference is perhaps more
striking. Since x¯ is a relational position the simultaneous motion of primary
and secondary with the same motion with respect to a reference frame does
not change the interaction, in other terms, the principle of action and reaction
holds and the conservation of the total linear moment is assured by Noether’s
theorem.
Maxwell’s derivation of the mechanical force (eq. C on the Treatise, art.
[619] p. 258), arrives to a similar result. For Maxwell, j2 is the “total” current,
i.e., the sum of the galvanic current and the displacement current. Remarkably,
Maxwell’s derivation of this force is performed for the galvanic current only and
therefore it coincides with the present one. The displacement current was added
to the galvanic one by analogical thinking, without further justification.
B.1 Maxwell’s transformation and the Lorentz’s force
Whenever we have an integral expression like eq.(15) it is possible to change
the spatial variable of integration without affecting the result. We intend to
change form x to z,with x = z + x¯(t), the integration variable. But instead of
performing the change in eq.(15) we will save effort and perform it in eq.(16).
We need to introduce the following notation
z = x− x¯(t)
V (z, t) = V (z + x¯(t), t)
A(z, t) = A(z + x¯(t), t)
j¯(z, t) = j¯2(z + x¯(t), t) = j2(z, t) + ˙¯xρ2(z, t)
Hence the variation reads
83
δˆ
Ldt =
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3z [(j2(z, t) + ˙¯xρ2(z, t)) · (δx¯ · ∇)A− ρ2 (δx¯ · ∇)V ]
+
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3z [δ ˙¯x · (Aρ2)]
Integrating by parts in time the last term and using the relations
ˆ
dt [δx˙ · (Aρ2)] =
ˆ
dt
[
−ρ2δx¯ ·
[
∂A
∂t
]
− δx¯ · A∂ρ2
∂t
]
−∇V − ∂A
∂t
= E¯ − ( ˙¯x · ∇)A
we arrive after some algebra to
δ
ˆ
Ldt =
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3y [j2 · (δx¯ · ∇)A− j2 · ∇ (δx¯ · A)]
+
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3y
[
(ρ2 ˙¯x) · (δx¯ · ∇)A+ ρ2δx¯ · (−∇V − ∂A
∂t
)
]
Making use of the following mathematical relations
x˙ · (δx¯ · ∇)A = δx¯ · ∇(x˙ ·A)
(δx¯ · ∇)Φ(x, t) = −δx¯× (∇× Φ) +∇(δx¯ · Φ)
j2 · (δx¯ · ∇)A− j2 · ∇(δx¯ · A) = j2 · (−δx¯× (∇×A)
the result for the electromagnetic force is:
δ
ˆ
Ldt =
ˆ
dt
ˆ
dz
[
δx¯ · ρ2
(
−∂A
∂t
−∇ (V − ˙¯x ·A)
)]
+dt
ˆ
dz [j2 · (−δx¯× (∇×A))]
=
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3z [δx¯ · Fem]
Hence we have two expressions for the mechanical contribution of the elec-
tromagnetic force that must be equal
Fem =
ˆ
d3z [(j¯2 + ρ¯2 ˙¯x)×B + ρ¯2E] =
ˆ
d3y
[
j2 × B¯ + ρ2 (−A−∇(V − ˙¯x ·A))
]
Which corresponds to the transformation proposed by Maxwell and discussed
in Theorem 3.3.1.
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B.2 The symmetry Einstein failed to see.
Let us consider a general quantity of the form
(ζ1|ζ2) = µ0
4π
ˆ
ds
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3x
ˆ
d3y ζ1(y, s)ζ2(x, t)
δ(t− s− 1
C
|x− y + u(t− s)|)
|x− y + u(t− s)|
e.g., the mechanical action corresponding to the electromagnetic interaction of
ζ1 and ζ2. We write a first form (using τ = t− s and also z = x+ ut )
(ζ1|ζ2) = µ0
4π
ˆ
ds
ˆ
dτ
ˆ
d3x
ˆ
d3y ζ1(y, s)ζ2(x, τ + s)
δ(τ − 1
C
|x− y + uτ |)
|x− y + uτ |
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
ds
ˆ
d3z
ˆ
d3y [ζ1(y, s)ζ2(z − uτ, τ + s)]
τ=
1
C
|z−y|
1
|z − y|
And a second (equivalent) form now using z = y − uτ
(ζ1|ζ2) = µ0
4π
ˆ
dt
ˆ
dτ
ˆ
d3x
ˆ
d3y ζ1(y, t− τ)ζ2(x, t)
δ(τ − 1
C
|x− y + uτ |)
|x− y + uτ |
=
µ0
4π
ˆ
dt
ˆ
d3z
ˆ
d3x [ζ1(z + uτ, t− τ)ζ2(x, t)]
τ=
1
C
|x−z|
1
|x− z|
The first form uses a forward potential and second a backward potential, the
different accounts for the difference between source and detector. But except for
this difference, forward fields can be defined following the same relations that
backward fields. Despite the well-known objection of Einstein (Einstein, 1905,
first paragraph) it is possible to make the reading in terms of the “electric field
arising in the neighbourhood of the magnet”, although we are not used to think
in these terms.
C Is there a relative velocity in special relativity?
Let us examine the standard view in special relativity (SR) that we take from an
authoritative source, the Feynman lectures of physics(Ch. 16, Vol. i, Feynman et al,
1965). It starts stating that the correct transformations between systems mov-
ing with relative velocity v are Lorentz transformations (emphasis added). We
stated its general expression in eq.(10), letting u =
v
C
(we drop the index C in
T v
C
for simplicity):
TvX =
(
γv(x − vt) + (1− γv)vˆ × (x× vˆ), γv(t− v · x
C2
)
)
=
(
γv ((x · vˆ) vˆ − vt) + vˆ × (x× vˆ), γv(t− v · x
C2
)
)
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where x ∈ R3 is a spatial coordinate and γv = (1 − v
2
C2
)−
1
2 . As in Ap-
pendix (A.2), we use that x = (x · vˆ) vˆ + vˆ × (x × vˆ). The book presents
only the special case where the velocity v between systems is parallel to the
xˆ1-axis of the S1 system, in components: (x′1, x
′
2, x
′
3, t
′) = Tv(x1, x2, x3, t) =
(γv(x1 − vt), x2, x3, γv(t− vx1
C2
)), arguing that the general case is “rather com-
plicated”. Here (x′1, x
′
2, x
′
3, t
′) ≡ (x′, t′) is the position and time in a system S2.
That the inverse transformation corresponds to T−v is explicitly highlighted, for
otherwise “we would have a real cause to worry!”.
Further, Einstein’s velocity transformation is presented by transforming the
line (x, t) = (ut, t) with t ∈ [−∞,∞] as points using Tv, resulting in the set
(x′, t′) = t
(
γv ((u · vˆ) vˆ − v) + vˆ × (u× vˆ), γv(1− v · u
C2
)
)
If u is the (constant) velocity of a third system S3 moving with respect to S1,
we would like to describe its velocity as seen by S2 as u′ = x
′
t′
. We note that the
line (x, t) = (vt, t) depicting the trajectory of S2 according to S1 transforms as
(x′, t′) = t(0,
1
γ
) indicating that S2 does not move according to S2, as it is always
the case with a subjective vision. However, this reasoning is arbitrary (it selects
a preferred system S1 for no reason) unless the same calculation interchanging
S2 with S3 could give the relative velocity −u′, and this for any choice of system
S1. Only in this way, relative velocity between S2 and S3 could be free from
dependencies on arbitrary choices. Computing the trajectory of S2 as seen from
S3 as above, we obtain
(x′′, t′′) = t
(
γu((uˆ · v)uˆ− u) + uˆ× (v × uˆ), γu(1− v · u
C2
)
)
The two resulting trajectories, (x′′, t′′) and (x′, t′) are not parallel unless u ‖ v,
and similarly
x′
t′
6= −x
′′
t′′
, or equivalently
x′
t′
+
x′′
t′′
6= 0. Therefore, the relative
velocity depends on the arbitrary form we choose to calculate it, i.e., there is
no genuine concept of relative velocity, it is a mere opinion that depends on ar-
bitrary decisions. The reader may want to verify the statement using v = |v|xˆ1
and u = |u|xˆ2. In short, we have:
Theorem C.1: In Lorentz transformation does not define an equivalence rela-
tion.
Proof: The reflexive and symmetric properties of equivalences are satisfied, but
the transitive property is not.✷
Corollary C.2: It is not possible to define the inertial class in terms of the
Lorentz transformation.
This problem emerges because of the lack of a group structure in Einstein’s
velocity addition (the same problem arises for the Lorentz transformations that
by themselves do not constitute a group). In the velocity transformations, the
associative property is missing. If we have an operation that we call velocity
addition and symbolise it by ⊕, having the basic property that v ⊕ (−v) = 0,
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then we would expect the relative velocity to be
u⊕ (−v)
and to satisfy the no arbitrariness relation
u⊕ (−v) = − (v ⊕ (−u))
or what is the same, that the law of transformation of reference systems is trans-
itive. If the operation ⊕ were to define a group, we could apply the associative
property of the group in the form
[v ⊕ (−u)]⊕ [u⊕ (−v)] = v ⊕ [[(−u)⊕ u]⊕ (−v)] = v ⊕ (−v) = 0
but this is not the case for relativistic velocity addition, since the lhs of this
equation corresponds to
x′
t′
+
x′′
t′′
. All sorts of contradictions can be obtained in
SR when three reference systems moving without restrictions are considered.
If points are transformed from S1 to S2 (S3) as
(x2, t2) = Tv(x1, t1)
(x3, t3) = Tu(x1, t1)
for any set of points B = {(x1, t1)} it follows that the transformation from S2
to S3 should be
(x3, t3) = Tu(x1, t1) = (TuT−v) (x2, t2)
However, since the Lorentz transformations do not commute in general, and they
are symmetric, TuT−v is not a Lorentz transformation but rather an element in
the Poincaré group. Any element P of the Poincaré group is written as:
P = TwR
where R is a rotation. Thus, TuT−v = TwR. If we further care to apply
this transformation to B′ = {(0, s), s ∈ [−∞,∞]}, being R(0, s) = (0, s) we
get TuT−v(0, s) = Tw(0, s) = γvsTu(−v, 1) which is Einstein’s velocity addition
law u ⊕ (−v) = w in its general form. This law is neither associative nor
commutative.
The rotation R is around the vector u × v and is known in SR as Thomas’
rotation. It is a spurious rotation that appears as a result of operating with two
successive Lorentz transformations in different directions and it has nothing to
do with normal rotations. It is worth noticing that if u = 0 or v = 0 the
rotation is the identity. Thus, the angle of rotation depends not only on the
directions of u, v but also on their absolute value. Hence, it depends on the
intermediate system S1 chosen to perform the transformation. It follows that
the transformation from S2 into S3 is not unique, it depends on which system
we have privileged to transform into others with R = Id. Arbitrariness has
a price: SR has no room for objective relations, despite every observer being
entitled to her/his own opinion. In the case of electromagnetism the natural
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choice would be the system where the electromagnetic disturbance takes place,
but at this point, the pretension of all systems being equivalent is completely
lost. In other words, we have proven the following
Theorem C.2: Given a system S an two bodies, {a, b}, moving uniformly
following a straight line through the origin, for the general case in which the
respective velocities are not parallel, it is not possible to define consistently a
relative velocity.
Proof: va ⊖ vb 6= − (vb ⊖ va)✷
Putting together Theorems C.1 and C.2, the inertial class that corresponds
to isolated systems does not exist in SR.
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